only the direct influence of veto players on implementation without accounting for the
indirect effect veto players have on Member States’ institutional structures.
Martin(1995) and Haverland (1999) operationalize veto players by examining
institutional veto points. Martin (1995) examines the role of opposition parties in
national parliaments. Haverland (1999) examines interest groups’ ability to interfere with
administrative agencies’ policy implementation. Both of these approaches account for
the indirect effects veto players have on implementation via national institutional
characteristics. However, neither approach accounts for the more direct effect
ideological distance within Member States’ cabinets has on policy implementation. Not
accounting for ideological distance between veto players is problematic because when
ideological positions are close, veto players’ disruptive effects diminish (Tsebelis 1995,
1999, 2002). Mbay (2001) operationalizes veto players by counting the number of
parties in government. This approach fails to account for the any veto players effect on
Member States’ institutional structures. This approach fails to account for two important
aspects of veto players theory. First, it does not account for veto players effects on
national institutions. Second, it does not account for the ideological divisions within
governments.
Tsebelis (2002) identifies a number of consequences from ideologically divided
veto players. The most important with regard to EU policy implementation is that
increasing the number and ideological division of veto players increases bureaucratic
autonomy. Bureaucratic autonomy and administrative structures are central to
understanding EU policy implementation because national administrative agencies
implement EU policy but are not subject to EU authority. Factors that increase the
autonomy of administrative agencies from Member State governments disrupt the chain
Convention