Author's Keywords: Treaty compliance; ratification; climate change; UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; Kyoto Protocol	Convention All Academic Convention can solve the abstract management needs for any association's annual meeting. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40646_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

von Stein, Jana. "Saving the Environment? Ratification and Compliance in the International Climate Change Regime" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC, Sep 01, 2005 <Not Available>. 2011-03-14 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40646_index.html>

von Stein, J. , 2005-09-01 "Saving the Environment? Ratification and Compliance in the International Climate Change Regime" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-03-14 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40646_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: A major challenge for the creators of international environmental agreements is how to design mechanisms that deter defection without deterring participation. The problem of global warming provides an interesting case in the study of international environmental cooperation: it presents a clear case of cross-national externalities where incentives to defect are high; it raises fundamental questions about economic growth and development; and there have been varying degrees of scientific uncertainty throughout the climate change regime's development. This paper seeks to advance our understanding of the relationship between institutional design, compliance, and ratification in international environmental affairs. I argue that differences in enforcement mechanisms from one treaty to the next have an important impact on states' decision to ratify international environmental agreements. Treaties that do not carry binding commitments will attract a large membership base, and the extent of compliant behavior will bear little relation to the decision to ratify. Treaties that carry quantified, legally-binding, commitments are much more likely to be enforced, and therefore states will be 'selective' about ratifying them. I test these arguments using a newly-compiled dataset on carbon dioxide emissions and ratification of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. The results yield strong support for my arguments. Although it is not yet possible to examine statistically the impact of these treaties on the extent of compliant behavior, the findings have important implications for future studies on that question, and for future institutional design in the international climate change regime.

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