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Saving the Environment? Ratification and Compliance in the International Climate Change Regime
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Saving the Environment? Ratification and Compliance
in the International Climate Change Regime
Jana von Stein
## email not listed ##
University of Michigan
5700 Haven Hall
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
– Draft. Comments very welcome, but please do not cite without author’s permission. –
Paper available at
http://www-personal.umich.edu/˜janavs/research.html
.
Paper prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September 1-4, 2005.
Abstract
A major challenge for the creators of international environmental agreements is how to design mech-
anisms that deter defection without deterring participation. The problem of global warming provides aninteresting case in the study of international environmental cooperation: it presents a clear case of cross-national externalities where incentives to defect are high; it raises fundamental questions about economicgrowth and development; and there have been varying degrees of scientific uncertainty throughout the cli-mate change regime’s development. This paper seeks to advance our understanding of the relationshipbetween institutional design, compliance, and ratification in international environmental affairs. I arguethat differences in enforcement mechanisms from one treaty to the next have an important impact on states’decision to ratify international environmental agreements. Treaties that do not carry binding commitmentswill attract a large membership base, and the extent of compliant behavior will bear little relation to thedecision to ratify. Treaties that carry quantified, legally-binding, commitments are much more likely tobe enforced, and therefore states will be ‘selective’ about ratifying them. I test these arguments using anewly-compiled dataset on carbon dioxide emissions and ratification of the UN Framework Convention onClimate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. The results yield strong support for my arguments. Although it isnot yet possible to examine statistically the impact of these treaties on the extent of compliant behavior, thefindings have important implications for future studies on that question, and for future institutional designin the international climate change regime.
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| | Authors: von Stein, Jana. |
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Saving the Environment? Ratification and Compliance
in the International Climate Change Regime
Jana von Stein
## email not listed ##
University of Michigan
5700 Haven Hall
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
– Draft. Comments very welcome, but please do not cite without author’s permission. –
Paper available at
http://www-personal.umich.edu/˜janavs/research.html
.
Paper prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September 1-4, 2005.
Abstract
A major challenge for the creators of international environmental agreements is how to design mech-
anisms that deter defection without deterring participation. The problem of global warming provides an
interesting case in the study of international environmental cooperation: it presents a clear case of cross-
national externalities where incentives to defect are high; it raises fundamental questions about economic
growth and development; and there have been varying degrees of scientific uncertainty throughout the cli-
mate change regime’s development. This paper seeks to advance our understanding of the relationship
between institutional design, compliance, and ratification in international environmental affairs. I argue
that differences in enforcement mechanisms from one treaty to the next have an important impact on states’
decision to ratify international environmental agreements. Treaties that do not carry binding commitments
will attract a large membership base, and the extent of compliant behavior will bear little relation to the
decision to ratify. Treaties that carry quantified, legally-binding, commitments are much more likely to
be enforced, and therefore states will be ‘selective’ about ratifying them. I test these arguments using a
newly-compiled dataset on carbon dioxide emissions and ratification of the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. The results yield strong support for my arguments. Although it is
not yet possible to examine statistically the impact of these treaties on the extent of compliant behavior, the
findings have important implications for future studies on that question, and for future institutional design
in the international climate change regime.
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