obvious. The problem with the former, of course, is that they do not create clear incentives
for states to change their behavior. On the other hand, precise, legally-binding IEAs may
deter from joining the very states whose environmental practices most needed changing. This
apparent tension between securing regime participation and improving practices is present
in many areas of international environmental cooperation. Indeed, as Mitchell and Keilbach
(2001, 891) note, one of the major challenges of IEAs is how to design mechanisms that deter
defection without deterring participation.
The problem of climate change provides a particularly interesting case for study, not only
because it is central to many current debates and its consequences are far-reaching, but also
because of the international political and institutional questions at play. It is a clear case
of cross-national externalities: one state’s greenhouse gas emissions can lead to flooding,
drops in agricultural yields, destruction of freshwater supplies, droughts, etc., in other states
(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [FCCC] 2005).
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The incentives
to free-ride are particularly high: because “each country can claim for itself only a small
fraction of the global benefit of its mitigation efforts, and because marginal abatement costs
are increasing, the incentive for countries to mitigate climate change on their own is greatly
reduced” (Barrett and Stavins 2003, 350).
Climate change presents a classic collective action problem, but it is compounded by
two additional considerations. First, there has been notable scientific uncertainty about
whether global warming is indeed occurring (although there is now fairly strong consensus
on this matter) and what its consequences will be. Second, the issue of climate change
raises a number of questions about sustainable development and how much of the burden
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Although a great deal of uncertainty remains about what the precise impacts of climate change will be,
most scientists agree that significant global warming – due to human activities – is occurring, and that “the
scientific understanding of climate change is now sufficiently clear to justify nations taking prompt action”
(Joint Science Academies 2005). For a dissenting view, see Michaels 2004.
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Convention