devise programs for data collection and climatological modeling, and “formulate, implement,
publish and regularly update ... programs containing measures to mitigate climate change”
(Article 10).
Another innovation of the Kyoto Protocol is the establishment of a Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), which allows an Annex 1 country to gain emissions credit at home for
reductions achieved by projects it sponsored in a non-Annex 1 country (Article 12).
7
The
developed countries supported this flexibility mechanism on the grounds that it enables them
to achieve emissions targets at a lower cost than if they were required to do so solely within
their national boundaries, since abatement costs are generally not uniform across country or
region (Parson and Fisher-Vanden 1999). Many developing countries supported the CDM
because it provides a means for them to obtain additional funding and technology transfers
while also demonstrating meaningful participation in the climate change regime (Repetto
2001). Yet many non-Annex 1 countries have also expressed concerns that CDM projects
could in effect be forced upon them, making them unable to manage local impacts or to
negotiate acceptable benefits (Parson and Fisher-Vanden 1999, 213). By the time the Kyoto
Protocol was opened for signature, several pilot projects were already underway as part of
the FCCC’s ‘Activities Implemented Jointly’ program. As it turns out, among the non-
Annex 1 countries, these projects largely took place in countries with relatively low CO
2
per capita emissions.
8
As a result, even among the Annex 1 countries, which did not make
binding, quantified, emissions commitments, one might expect those with lower per capita
emissions to be more supportive of the Kyoto regime than those with higher emissions.
7
Two additional flexibility mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol are carbon sinks and emissions trading.
For greater detail, see Thompson 2005.
8
Among non-Annex 1/B countries, those selected for such projects as of 2002 (FCCC 2005) had mean
CO
2
emissions per capita of 1.694, whereas those not selected had mean emissions of 3.837 (World Bank
2004). A simple cross-sectional probit analysis (N = 143) indicates that countries with lower per capita
emissions are significantly more likely to be selected for these projects (p = .097).
8
Convention