what motivates it – is rooted in the explanations posed by realists about the interaction between
states, and the liberal and constructivist critique of these paradigms. Debating these issues is a
derivative of power politics among states: Are states willing to relinquish power in order to
lower costs? Is cooperation a preference that enhances power rather than reduces it? Although it
is rational for states to resist relinquishing power or putting themselves in a situation where they
do not get their way in foreign policy decisions, RDBs demonstrate that under certain
circumstances, states prefer to become members of such institutions, when they perceive that
their gains most likely surpass their losses.
The history of the RDBs inception demonstrates that timing – both political and
economic – is essential for the creation of multilateral financial institutions. However, this does
not preclude ‘power-politics’. In fact, as Thacker claims, multilateral organizations are “…in a
sense a difficult or crucial case for political theories of international finance. It is easy to see
how bilateral capital flows could be subjected to the push and pull of international and domestic
politics, but on the executive board of the IMF any single country’s power is diluted by the
presence of other principals within the decision-making body.” (Thacker 1999, p. 71).
Similar to the IMF, RDBs are a tough case for proponents of statist theories. Much of the
‘push and pull’ politiquing is done behind the scenes and in informal ways. The observable
outcomes are mostly a result of official unified board decisions, endorsed by the majority (and
usually all) of the member countries. Throughout the years, a certain institutional discourse has
developed which enables the various members to sense conflict before it arises, and informal
institutional mechanisms solve these problems or eliminate them before they reach the formal
stages of negotiation. For example, knowledge of the US stance on most issues enables the
banks’ staff to draft proposals that take into account US position and strategize the proposal to fit
US guidelines for support. If there is an anticipated conflict, discussions will take place before
proposals are brought to the Board for a vote. At the IDB for instance, a proposal that is not
already (unofficially) ‘pre-approved’ by the US will not reach the voting phase.
Theories abound on international cooperation, how it is achieved, how it endures and its
significance. As political organizations with governments as members, as institutions with a
corporate-like structure and economic goals, and as agents located in different regions with
different members, susceptible to cultural influences, RDBs display a complexity which is
1
And gains, in this case, may not always be financial: They include reputation, spill-over effect, bargaining tools,
influence, etc.
3
Convention