American movements, rather than being a source of direct attacks on the United States or
on Americans.
Other forms of anti-Americanism could generate legacy anti-
Americanism. For instance, sovereign-nationalists or radicals could be convinced that
their societies had been harmed by the United States, while liberals and social democrats,
in the same societies, could view the effects of the United States as largely benign. The
belief of the former set of people could intensify their anti-American sentiments. Legacy
anti-Americanism can be explosive but it is not unalterable. History both creates and
eviscerates the roots that feed it.
Systematizing the Typology
We arrived at these six forms of anti-Americanism inductively, and it is clear that
they are quite heterogeneous. We can build a more satisfactory typology by putting the
last two forms -- legacy and elitist anti-Americanism -- aside and concentrating on the
other four. These four types of anti-Americanism are the basis for the fourfold typology
shown in Figure 2.
-- Figure 2 about here --
The fundamental dimension along which these four types of anti-Americanism
vary is the normative one of identification.
This concept refers to the degree to which
individuals identify with the United States, or on the contrary, identify themselves as in
opposition or even hostile to it. Liberals identify with Americans, although they may be
very critical of the failure of the United States to pursue actions consistent with its
professed values. Social and Christian democrats share democratic principles with the
United States but define other values very differently from those of Americans, typically
rejecting America’s lack of an extensive welfare state and various of its social policies,
including the death penalty. Sovereign-nationalists identify with their nation, which they
may or may not perceive as threatened by the United States. Radicals define themselves
in opposition to the United States and the values for which it stands.
Whether these identifications translate into anti-Americanism, or into very active
anti-Americanism, depends, we conjecture, on an emotional dimension: the extent to
which the United States is feared. In chapter 6 Johnston and Stockman distinguish, based
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In chapter 3 Isernia analyzes the multidimensionality of European views of America in terms of threat
and mastery, involving variable degrees of in-group identification, possibly based on modal distribuitions
of opinion in Europe, distrust in East Asia and bias in the Middle East. They yield variable degrees of
mastery over one’s environment. Isernia’s two dimensions are conceptually related to, though distinct from,
the ones we develop here.
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Convention