supported the American war in Iraq, and that Canada, France, and Germany did not. But
despite the drops in their ratings, a majority of the American public viewed these three
countries in 2003 and in 2004 as allied or at least friendly to the United States.
--Table 2 about here --
Anti-American views are not only multidimensional but also very heterogeneous.
There exists substantial and persistent cross-country variation in Western European
attitudes toward the United States. Between 1976 and 1997, on average, respondents in
the following countries reported that they had “some trust” or “a lot of trust” in
Americans: between 74 and 76 percent in Denmark, West Germany, Great Britain, and
Netherlands; between 63 to 70 percent in Portugal, Italy, Belgium, and France; but only
46 percent in Spain (1986-97) and 38 percent in Greece (1980-1997).
Various expressions of anti-Americanism seem to have some common elements,
including expressions of resentment of America and charges of hypocrisy leveled against
the U. S. government. There exists, however, a great deal of variation. Some expressions
of antipathy are linked directly to U.S. policies or capabilities, both past and present.
Others are linked to the real or imagined gap between American ideals and the actual
conduct of the United States. Still others seem to reflect profound differences between the
respondent’s and American values and identity. At every level, there is so much
variation by country and region that it would be better to speak of anti-Americanisms
than of anti-Americanism.
Clearly, people in different countries have very different evaluations of America
and of current American policy. We conjecture that evaluations of current policy may
perform a triggering function, shifting what could be pro-Americanism or neutrality to
anti-Americanism, or intensifying the level of anti-Americanism. One of the important
questions today about anti-Americanism is the extent to which opposition to American
foreign policy spills over into more deep-seated antipathy to America that generates a
new kind of identity as well as to institutionalized forms of bias. If such a “ratchet
effect” exists, the implications for America’s role in the world and its “soft power” would
be much greater than if a change in foreign policy would restore positive views of the
17
Chiozza 2004, Eurobarometer polls, various years. See also Free 1976
18
Nye, 2004.
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Convention