Author's Keywords: imperialism, institutions, conquest, commerce, formal model	Convention Convention is an application service for managing large or small academic conferences, annual meetings, and other types of events! Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40676_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Leo, Blanken. and Gartner, Scott. "Needing an Arm to Twist: Conquest vs. Commerce in Asymmetric Dyads, the Role of Institutions" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC, Sep 01, 2005 <Not Available>. 2011-03-14 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40676_index.html>

Leo, B. and Gartner, S. S. , 2005-09-01 "Needing an Arm to Twist: Conquest vs. Commerce in Asymmetric Dyads, the Role of Institutions" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-03-14 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40676_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Formal imperial expansion is a phenomenon that is poorly explained by existing international relations and political economy literature. We present a model of revenue maximizing sovereigns choosing to conquer or not conquer regions based on their institutional constraints and incentives, the institutional constraints and incentives of imperial rivals, as well as the presence or absence of an “assurance framework” of institutions in the target region. Selectorate dynamics drive institutional constraints. We find that small W states have a weakly dominant strategy to always take because they are unable to obtain useful benefits without direct imperial control. The small W (such as 19th century Portugal) state cannot politically sustain free trade in its own domain, and cannot even benefit from other large W states providing free trade zones. For large W states (such as 19th century Great Britain), when the belief in attractive institutional target attributes is high, leaving is more likely to occur as a policy for a large W type actor. Conversely, when the belief about an assurance framework is low, taking becomes more attractive. For small W states, competition with other potential imperial states has no effect. Large W states can free ride and benefit on a potential adversary’s free trade, but fight to conquer areas that lack assurance frameworks. The model is formalized as games of incomplete information, solved for by Bayes Nash equilibria. Employing primary and secondary sources, we use the theory to explain European imperial expansion in nineteenth- century tropical Africa – in particular, the carving up of African territory among the great powers during the Berlin Conference of 1884-85.

Imposing States: Great Power Competition, International Organisations, and the Re-Shaping of Domestic Politics through Non-State Actors

Power and its Constraint under Globalization: Interaction and Interdependency among the Chinese Labor, State and the US Market Actors through International Political Economic Connections