Author's Keywords: Self-determination, secession, bargaining	Convention Convention is an application service for managing large or small academic conferences, annual meetings, and other types of events! Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40699_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Cunningham, Kathleen. "Bargaining for Autonomy: Why States and Self-Determination Movements Fail" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC, Sep 01, 2005 <Not Available>. 2011-03-14 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40699_index.html>

Cunningham, K. G. , 2005-09-01 "Bargaining for Autonomy: Why States and Self-Determination Movements Fail" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-03-14 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40699_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Disputes over self-determination have become some of the most prevalent conflicts in the international system today and have shown remarkable resistance to settlement. Even among the states that have been able to reach agreements over autonomy with their self-determination movements, only 9% of these agreements are implemented, while over 60% remained contested in 2003. Why can some pairs of states and self-determination groups reach and implement agreement over autonomy while so many others are unable to do so? I argue that the number of internal factions within states and groups make bargaining over autonomy harder (and more likely to fail) by increasing the amount of uncertainty between the two sides, decreasing their ability to remain cohesive throughout the bargaining process, and decreasing their ability to avoid internal deadlock or spoiling. I predict that agreement is most likely when there are a moderate number of factions in the state and either a low or very high number of factions within self-determination groups. I test these predictions on random sample of self-determination group/state dyads from 1960 to 2003. My analysis shows that the number of factions within states and groups are an important determinant of whether they can reach an agreement over autonomy.

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