4
generated by my theory. The sixth section details the research design I have used to test these
hypotheses and my results. The final section includes a discussion of my findings and conclusions.
The Politics of Self-determination
The politics of self-determination is an ongoing political contest over autonomy between
mobilized minority groups and their parent states. When self-determination movements are active,
the group and the state engage in a continuous bargain over the level of autonomy that the group
will enjoy within the state (or at the extreme, whether the group will remain part of the state).
3
This
bargaining process is sometimes explicit and formal (carried out through official negotiations), and
at other times takes place informally. These contests take the form of both electoral and physical
struggles, with fits and starts of activity on the part of both self-determination groups and states.
Some contests degenerate into secessionist wars while others simmer at low levels of violence or
remain totally non-violent. However, behind each contest is an implicit threat of secession, which
demands the attention of states. Indeed, in the past 20 years, 36 self-determination contests have
degenerated into full-scale war.
4
Given the costliness of internal violence, and the risk of escalation,
states will attempt to settle demands when possible and minimize the potential for recurrent
violence.
5
In this paper, I use a simple model of bargaining to derive hypotheses about the likelihood
of a successful autonomy agreement being reached. This model is a simplification based on
assumptions that necessarily will not capture or approximate the complexity of the real situation.
However, using a simplified model will help us understand better the set of constraints on the
bargaining process that internal divisions generate. The bargain that takes place between the group
3
An “inactive” movement is a group categorized as being a self-determination group (one that has some grievance over
autonomy status), but that is not making any demands for a change in autonomy at that time.
4
CIDCM Peace and Conflict 2003.
5
There may be conditions under which states will be willing to bear the costs on internal violence, and I will attempt to
control for some possibilities in the empirical analysis. However, I argue in this theory, that bargaining failure is possible
even when states do have clear incentives and a desire to settle conflicts ex ante and avoid violence.
Convention