professional military fighting in Algeria- a revolt that, while quickly contained, seriously
questioned the health of the French civil-military relationship. The consequences of the
revolt included a lingering distrust between the professional military and the political
establishment, the evisceration of the army’s most combat-experienced and talented
units (leading to a serious reduction in the war-fighting ability of the French military,) and
a continuing rift between the military and the French population as a whole.
France’s civil-military conflict that culminated during the Algerian insurgency
stemmed from two problems latent in the nation’s civil-military relationship. First, since at
least 1940 (when de Gaulle called for the de facto mutiny of the French Army against
Petain’s acquiescence to Germany’s invasion,) the French Army believed itself to be
beholden to the “nation” above the “state.”
Reinforced by the staccato transition of
governments during the Fourth Republic, the French Army found that both its anchor
and lodestone had to be an entity more permanent than the changing administrations
facing France. The interests of the army, therefore, were reflected in the “national”
interests, rather than the simple political machinations of the government of the day.
Unfortunately, the key question remained as to who determined those national interests.
In the army’s mind, due to the indecisiveness and impermanence of the French
government, it was the military (the professional military) that must divine these
interests, and, likewise, decide when military force was necessary. However, as Orville
Menard notes in his study of this civil-military conflict,
One of the foundations of civil control of the military is that the military is an
instrument, a basis the army denies when it ascribes to itself the right to judge and make
its obedience conditional. The second foundation of civil control is that, in a democracy,
the military does not have, nor has any special group, the right to dictate to the
remainder of the nation. The nation democratically consulted is the final word of the
nation, and not one of the special groups of the state no matter how exalted its
conception of its national functions, and no matter how rationalized by the advocates of
intervention.
19
Convention