the war’s aftermath. Fourth, what is the contemporary status of the gap? How have
social and political changes, inside and outside the military, changed the tension?
Finally, given all of these considerations, what possible predictions can we make about
the future of the gap? Are there alternatives to the predicted future, and, if so, what
avenues must the American society and its military take to avoid conflict growing from
this continuing tension?
Before addressing any of these facets, however, we should frame our discussion
by emphasizing the danger of any societal civil-military gap. Throughout history, many
states, recognizing the fundamental differences between civilian and military
environments, have attempted to divorce the two, in order to allow each to develop in its
own sphere. Unfortunately, such a course of action forgets two important aspects
concerning the proper functioning of a society, and, in the present-day, of a nation-state.
First, a military employs and manages one of the defining traits of the state- the
monopoly and use of organized violence. It is this monopoly, this ability to answer to no
power higher than itself and to impose its will on subordinates/members/citizens, that
provides the state one aspect of its legitimacy. When a state loses control of or forfeits
this monopoly, its very future is in doubt. One path toward such forfeiture is to invest a
military unresponsive to the needs or wants of the society with this power. An important
indication of such a military may be a large gulf (a gap) between the values and priorities
of the military and its society. In effect, the gap can lead to either a proactive military-
one that defines (and therefore protects) its own interests as society’s interests; or the
civil-military gap can lead to an apathetic and ambivalent society that, since it cannot
control its military, abdicates the use of the military as a political instrument.
Another key detrimental impact of a civil-military gap concerns the manning of a
society’s military. While history has shown that societies can raise and sustain armies
through a variety of means, the most effective militaries have consisted of domestic
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