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Okinawa's Anti-Base Social Movement in the 1990s: Movement Mechanisms, Countermovement Efforts, and the Policy Outcome
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of the Japanese population, and Okinawan representatives occupy only eight seats in the 752-member national government.
65
Okinawans strongly resent the fact that many in
the mainland stress the importance of the U.S.-Japan security alliance while being very reluctant to accept any responsibility or burden for maintaining the alliance. Under such a circumstance, the Okinawan movement to reduce or eliminate military bases continues to face tremendous odds. In the 1990s, as the two governments agreed to strengthen their alliance, the movement’s demand to reduce military bases without relocation within Okinawa or revision of SOFA was not entirely acceptable to the two governments.
66
The two governments, fully cognizant of the Japanese mainland opinion
about their security alliance, did not have much of an incentive to drastically change the status quo either.
Pro-base interest groups also had reasons to oppose the social movement
demands. These groups include base construction companies, base labor groups, companies providing entertainment and other services for U.S. military personnel around bases, and others that stand to gain from the U.S. presence. If military bases are reduced and eventually eliminated, these groups of people will suffer economically. They wish to safeguard the benefits from the troops’ presence.
67
There are pro-base interest groups outside of Okinawa as well. For example,
many business elites in the U.S. and Japan also agree that the U.S. military presence in Okinawa is beneficial. They argue that the U.S. forward deployment provides regional stability, and this stability protects U.S. and Japanese economic interests. Maintaining regional security has become more important as regional trade increased steadily over the years. In addition, from the Japanese standpoint, obtaining regional stability by hosting the U.S. military in Japan is a much cheaper (and thus better) strategy then building up its military to perform the same function. Indeed, Japan was able to achieve its rapid economic development in the post-WWII period partly because the U.S. military protection made it unnecessary for Japan to maintain its own strong military. Japan was able to invest its assets in economic development, instead of investing them in military development. Even today, Japan only spends about one percent of its GNP on defense. The U.S. military presence in Japan has served the business elites well. In sum, pro-base interest groups would not jeopardize the economic benefits produced by the U.S. military presence in Okinawa, by supporting significant curtailment or
65
Ota and Ikezawa 1998: 58.
66
In addition, the U.S. military and administration seem quite skeptical about the Japanese legal system,
and reluctant to relinquish control over the U.S. personnel.
67
These groups have traditionally lobbied to bring economic assistance from Tokyo, playing a role in
connecting economic assistance with base maintenance in Okinawa.
APSA 2005 Kawato 19
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of the Japanese population, and Okinawan representatives occupy only eight seats in the
752-member national government.
Okinawans strongly resent the fact that many in
the mainland stress the importance of the U.S.-Japan security alliance while being very
reluctant to accept any responsibility or burden for maintaining the alliance. Under
such a circumstance, the Okinawan movement to reduce or eliminate military bases
continues to face tremendous odds. In the 1990s, as the two governments agreed to
strengthen their alliance, the movement’s demand to reduce military bases without
relocation within Okinawa or revision of SOFA was not entirely acceptable to the two
governments.
The two governments, fully cognizant of the Japanese mainland opinion
about their security alliance, did not have much of an incentive to drastically change the
status quo either.
Pro-base interest groups also had reasons to oppose the social movement
demands. These groups include base construction companies, base labor groups,
companies providing entertainment and other services for U.S. military personnel
around bases, and others that stand to gain from the U.S. presence. If military bases are
reduced and eventually eliminated, these groups of people will suffer economically.
They wish to safeguard the benefits from the troops’ presence.
There are pro-base interest groups outside of Okinawa as well. For example,
many business elites in the U.S. and Japan also agree that the U.S. military presence in
Okinawa is beneficial. They argue that the U.S. forward deployment provides regional
stability, and this stability protects U.S. and Japanese economic interests. Maintaining
regional security has become more important as regional trade increased steadily over
the years. In addition, from the Japanese standpoint, obtaining regional stability by
hosting the U.S. military in Japan is a much cheaper (and thus better) strategy then
building up its military to perform the same function. Indeed, Japan was able to achieve
its rapid economic development in the post-WWII period partly because the U.S.
military protection made it unnecessary for Japan to maintain its own strong military.
Japan was able to invest its assets in economic development, instead of investing them
in military development. Even today, Japan only spends about one percent of its GNP
on defense. The U.S. military presence in Japan has served the business elites well. In
sum, pro-base interest groups would not jeopardize the economic benefits produced by
the U.S. military presence in Okinawa, by supporting significant curtailment or
65
Ota and Ikezawa 1998: 58.
66
In addition, the U.S. military and administration seem quite skeptical about the Japanese legal system,
and reluctant to relinquish control over the U.S. personnel.
67
These groups have traditionally lobbied to bring economic assistance from Tokyo, playing a role in
connecting economic assistance with base maintenance in Okinawa.
APSA 2005 Kawato 19
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