 |
Okinawa's Anti-Base Social Movement in the 1990s: Movement Mechanisms, Countermovement Efforts, and the Policy Outcome
| |
| | Unformatted Document Text:
In September 1995 in Okinawa, Japan, three U.S. military personnel kidnapped
a twelve-year-old girl and raped her on a deserted beach. Okinawan people immediately took to the streets and continued to protest against the rape. The Okinawa Prefectural Citizen’s Rally in October gathered approximately 91,000 participants.
1
At
the rally, the participants made four demands to the U.S. and Japanese governments: eradication of crimes by U.S. servicemen, an apology and total compensation to the rape victim, revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to facilitate handover of American suspects to the Japanese authorities, and re-organization and reduction of U.S. military bases.
2
This is an example of individuals with grievances about U.S. military bases
abroad, participating in a social movement to voice their policy preferences and influence states’ base policies. Their activism raises important questions about effectiveness: Do social movements influence international security policy? If so, to what extent, when, and how? Exploring social movements’ impact on security policy goes beyond the usual focus on states and interest groups in studying international security. In addition, social movements happen within social and political environments where states and interest groups also seek to influence policy. Therefore, it is important to ask a broader question: Which actors create, maintain, and change security policies? When, why, and how do they do so?
The few international relations scholars who have examined this topic offer two
explanations to account for base policies. First, realists say that demands for military effectiveness determine base policies.
3
They focus on states as units of analysis, and
study the U.S. military, president, Congress, military and civilian analysts, and their counterparts in states that host U.S. military bases, who decide what is best for military effectiveness. The balance of threat theory suggests that states balance against the most threatening states. State actors’ perception of threat from potential enemies guides their decision about what is necessary for military effectiveness. There are also several
1
There were 85,000 demonstrators in the main island of Okinawa, and 3,000 each at islands of Miyako
and Yaeyama. The demonstration was organized on October 21, 1995, although many Okinawans took to the streets immediately after the rape incident in September and continued demonstrating until October. Numbers taken from Herikichi Hantaikyou 1999: 170.
2
Arasaki 1996: 210.
3
Policy analyses and other policy-oriented research tend to focus on military effectiveness. Chalmers
Johnson and Doug Bandow advocate reduction and eventual elimination of U.S. troops in Okinawa, saying the troops do not have to be in Okinawa for military effectiveness (among other reasons). See Johnson 1996, Bandow 1998, 1999. Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki also consider military effectiveness, and argue that U.S. forces can be reduced in Okinawa if Japan could perform a broader range of security activities to share defense burdens with the United States. See O’Hanlon and Mochizuki 1998, and O’Hanlon 1997. Also see Tokai Daigaku Heiwa Senryaku Kokusai Kenkyujo 1997, Kenmochi 1997 for discussion of the relationship between bases and military effectiveness.
APSA 2005 Kawato 2
|
| |
| |
|
|
In September 1995 in Okinawa, Japan, three U.S. military personnel kidnapped
a twelve-year-old girl and raped her on a deserted beach. Okinawan people
immediately took to the streets and continued to protest against the rape. The Okinawa
Prefectural Citizen’s Rally in October gathered approximately 91,000 participants.
At
the rally, the participants made four demands to the U.S. and Japanese governments:
eradication of crimes by U.S. servicemen, an apology and total compensation to the
rape victim, revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to facilitate handover of
American suspects to the Japanese authorities, and re-organization and reduction of U.S.
military bases.
This is an example of individuals with grievances about U.S. military bases
abroad, participating in a social movement to voice their policy preferences and
influence states’ base policies. Their activism raises important questions about
effectiveness: Do social movements influence international security policy? If so, to
what extent, when, and how? Exploring social movements’ impact on security policy
goes beyond the usual focus on states and interest groups in studying international
security. In addition, social movements happen within social and political environments
where states and interest groups also seek to influence policy. Therefore, it is important
to ask a broader question: Which actors create, maintain, and change security policies?
When, why, and how do they do so?
The few international relations scholars who have examined this topic offer two
explanations to account for base policies. First, realists say that demands for military
effectiveness determine base policies.
They focus on states as units of analysis, and
study the U.S. military, president, Congress, military and civilian analysts, and their
counterparts in states that host U.S. military bases, who decide what is best for military
effectiveness. The balance of threat theory suggests that states balance against the most
threatening states. State actors’ perception of threat from potential enemies guides their
decision about what is necessary for military effectiveness. There are also several
1
There were 85,000 demonstrators in the main island of Okinawa, and 3,000 each at islands of Miyako
and Yaeyama. The demonstration was organized on October 21, 1995, although many Okinawans took to
the streets immediately after the rape incident in September and continued demonstrating until October.
Numbers taken from Herikichi Hantaikyou 1999: 170.
2
Arasaki 1996: 210.
3
Policy analyses and other policy-oriented research tend to focus on military effectiveness. Chalmers
Johnson and Doug Bandow advocate reduction and eventual elimination of U.S. troops in Okinawa,
saying the troops do not have to be in Okinawa for military effectiveness (among other reasons). See
Johnson 1996, Bandow 1998, 1999. Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki also consider military
effectiveness, and argue that U.S. forces can be reduced in Okinawa if Japan could perform a broader
range of security activities to share defense burdens with the United States. See O’Hanlon and
Mochizuki 1998, and O’Hanlon 1997. Also see Tokai Daigaku Heiwa Senryaku Kokusai Kenkyujo 1997,
Kenmochi 1997 for discussion of the relationship between bases and military effectiveness.
APSA 2005 Kawato 2
|
|
 Convention | | All Academic Convention makes running your annual conference simple and cost effective. It is your online solution for abstract management, peer review, and scheduling for your annual meeting or convention. | | Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. | | Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! | | Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! | | Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. | | Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! | | Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! | | Click here for more information. |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
