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Okinawa's Anti-Base Social Movement in the 1990s: Movement Mechanisms, Countermovement Efforts, and the Policy Outcome
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intervening variables between the definition of military effectiveness and policy outcome, including alliance strength and burden sharing, as well as bargaining between states.
Second, international relations scholars -- mostly liberals but also some realists
-- study the influence of domestic interest groups and argue that powerful interest groups that benefit from the military presence dictate base policies.
4
Such interest
groups may represent base construction companies, firms that undertake various contract services for the U.S. military, local base labor unions, military weapons industry, and trade corporations that seek regional security. This explanation focuses on the interest groups’ concentrated interests (in contrast to the diffused public interests) which allow the groups to mobilize resources for lobbying state officials for particular base policies.
These explanations, however, leave many empirical puzzles unanswered. Why,
for example, are the U.S. and Japanese governments currently negotiating relocation of U.S. military functions and troops from Okinawa to mainland Japan, when Okinawa is closer to potential battlegrounds (like Taiwan and South China Sea), has excellent training areas and entrenched pro-base interests? Similarly, why did the Philippines Senate vote against the renewal of the Military Base Agreement in 1991 despite the strong American desire to remain there, and despite mobilization of pro-base groups for the continued U.S. presence? These outcomes are puzzling when considering the expectations of scholars studying military effectiveness and interest groups.
In these empirical cases and others, anti-base social movements have sought to
change base policies and seem to have influenced base policies. Therefore, I will study social movements that oppose states and pro-base interest groups’ policies. Social movements, however, do not always produce policy change.
5
In the history of anti-base
social movements, there have been many instances where protest activities did not result in significant base policy change. Therefore, it is important to examine the interaction between states, pro-base interest groups, and anti-base social movements, and ask if social movements have impact on base policies. If social movements influence base policies, when, how, and how much do they influence base policies?
In the social movement literature, there are four main mechanisms through
4
A publication by a group called Kaijo Heri Kichi Kensetsu Hantai: Heiwa to Nagoshisei Minshuka wo
Motomeru Kyogikai discusses business interest groups. See their book published in 1999. Also, see Ota 2000: 159-165, and Arasaki 1996: 232-3 about the role of business interests.
5
This also does not mean that all social movements aim for policy change.
APSA 2005 Kawato 3
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intervening variables between the definition of military effectiveness and policy
outcome, including alliance strength and burden sharing, as well as bargaining between
states.
Second, international relations scholars -- mostly liberals but also some realists
-- study the influence of domestic interest groups and argue that powerful interest
groups that benefit from the military presence dictate base policies.
Such interest
groups may represent base construction companies, firms that undertake various
contract services for the U.S. military, local base labor unions, military weapons
industry, and trade corporations that seek regional security. This explanation focuses on
the interest groups’ concentrated interests (in contrast to the diffused public interests)
which allow the groups to mobilize resources for lobbying state officials for particular
base policies.
These explanations, however, leave many empirical puzzles unanswered. Why,
for example, are the U.S. and Japanese governments currently negotiating relocation of
U.S. military functions and troops from Okinawa to mainland Japan, when Okinawa is
closer to potential battlegrounds (like Taiwan and South China Sea), has excellent
training areas and entrenched pro-base interests? Similarly, why did the Philippines
Senate vote against the renewal of the Military Base Agreement in 1991 despite the
strong American desire to remain there, and despite mobilization of pro-base groups for
the continued U.S. presence? These outcomes are puzzling when considering the
expectations of scholars studying military effectiveness and interest groups.
In these empirical cases and others, anti-base social movements have sought to
change base policies and seem to have influenced base policies. Therefore, I will study
social movements that oppose states and pro-base interest groups’ policies. Social
movements, however, do not always produce policy change.
In the history of anti-base
social movements, there have been many instances where protest activities did not result
in significant base policy change. Therefore, it is important to examine the interaction
between states, pro-base interest groups, and anti-base social movements, and ask if
social movements have impact on base policies. If social movements influence base
policies, when, how, and how much do they influence base policies?
In the social movement literature, there are four main mechanisms through
4
A publication by a group called Kaijo Heri Kichi Kensetsu Hantai: Heiwa to Nagoshisei Minshuka wo
Motomeru Kyogikai discusses business interest groups. See their book published in 1999. Also, see Ota
2000: 159-165, and Arasaki 1996: 232-3 about the role of business interests.
5
This also does not mean that all social movements aim for policy change.
APSA 2005 Kawato 3
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