The Athenian speech indicates the extent to which motives can be reinforcing or
cross-cutting. Fear and honor were conjoined at the outset; resistance to Persia,
understood as the only way to save their lives and independence, required Athenians to
put together a coalition of Greek states to resist the Persian invader, and subsequently to
evacuate their city and risk everything on a naval battle in the Strait of Salamis.
Individual Athenians were also motivated by fear and honor; they fought to gain
recognition and honors as they struggled to save their families and homeland.
on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, interest had entered the picture, and allied with
honor and fear, led Athens to impose and economic blockade on Megara and lay siege to
Potidaea. These actions were contrary to contemporary understandings of honorable
behavior. At Melos, fifteen years into the war, honor and fear were fully opposed as both
the manner in which the Athenians justified their motives and how they subsequently
treated the Melians were thoroughly dishonorable by fifth century Greek standards.
What are the implications of this complexity for my theory? For a start, we
distinguish actors from the systems in which they function. It is possible to have a
system in which one motive more or less predominates and considerable variance at the
actor level. A relevant comparison may be to climate versus weather. Climate is stable
enough for long enough periods of time to allow a valid general description. Weather can
vary enormously without necessarily having any impact on the climate. Climate will
determine the range within which this variation occurs, and its mean – or means, if there
are multiple equilibria, as is sometimes the case.
As climate influences weather,
systemic pressures in a political system will influence unit level behavior by helping to
shape goals and strategies, and more fundamentally, by determining who counts as an
actor.
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Convention