Smith
before the war in Greece, to get a sense of the divisions that characterized Western
relations over the shape of Europe. As The Wall Street Journal replied: “This country’s
reaction to Mr. Churchill must be convincing proof that the U.S. wants no alliance, or
anything that resembles an alliance with other nations.”
were certainly sympathetic to Churchill’s view and Kennan’s “long telegram” had been
received in Washington two weeks earlier, this divide helps illustrate the lack of cohesion
among the Western powers. The outbreak of renewed war in Southeast Europe, however,
had a catalyzing impact on West European relations.
On one hand, the perceived threat to Western Europe was much more diffuse than
many would have us believe. Rather than cooperating to meet a clear and present
military danger, initial cooperation was based along the fear that non-cooperation would
invite instability that could make Western Europe fertile ground for renewed conflict.
That is, the threat was political not military. U.S. emphasis was placed on economic
recovery not military rearmament, while West European governments knew too well how
vulnerable their populations were to economic collapse and the need to prioritize
reconstruction as the core defense against instability and renewed warfare.
Indeed, even
Great Britain, which was better-off than much of Europe and faced little threat of
communist takeover, feared looming economic collapse could lead to rapid imperial
retrenchment that would leave a political vacuum—particularly along the Mediterranean
—ripe for war. Making this point, Hugh Dalton, British Chancellor of the Exchequer,
wrote Prime Minister Attlee in 1947: “What shall it profit Britain to have even 1.5
million men in the armed forces…and be spending nearly one billion pounds a year on
them, if we come an economic and financial cropper two years hence.”
Exacerbating
72
Quoted in Cook, Forging the Alliance, p. 55.
73
Leffler, Preponderance of Power, pp. 147-151.
74
Quoted in Cook, Forging the Alliance, p. 67.
29