Smith
This is where we find the seeds for all future European
cooperation. The European Recovery Plan went forward with the understanding that
regional recovery was vital to stability and, in turn, to each individual state’s resilience in
the face of rapidly changing times. NATO followed a little over a year later, formalizing
not only U.S. commitments to Europe but also its military presence. However, it was the
insecurity posed by the Greek conflict that glaringly brought to light the volatility of the
European continent and the necessity for cooperative efforts to stem the spread of
turmoil, initially through economic means. Indeed, there was little differentiation
between economic and military security at the time, given Western fear was not
necessarily of military origin but of instability that invited the outbreak and spread of
renewed violence.
To be sure, Greece presented a potential spark many thought could and would
lead to renewed continental if not global warfare. While regional and great powers had
opportunities to interject forces that could secure both prestige and a highly valued
strategic foothold, all were less than willing to risk entering into the war proper.
Moreover, each sought to reassure others that they had come to this conclusion so as not
to encourage others to enter into the war. While the above provided only a cursory
glance at regional reactions to the Greek civil war, we can see the shock waves it sent
across the continent and the Atlantic. Not only were no other states willing to risk wider
war (H1) but the Soviet Union and the Western powers went to great lengths to signal
this (H2). Moreover, the Greek civil war sparked a series of costly signals among the
West toward cooperation in an effort to bolster against the spread of turmoil. However,
we find mixed evidence for (H3) the argument that states will distance themselves from
105
See Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), pp. 9-79.
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