18
dominance at the global level,
51
another scholar considers the Bush
administration’s approach to North Korea as a means to “develop the all-round
US-Japan and US-ROK alliances facing the whole East Asia in the 21st century.”
52
In terms of the nature and magnitude of the North Korean challenge as
well, regional policymakers and scholars think less about the nuclear issue itself
than the impact of the issue on broader regional security dynamics such as
China-Japan rivalry, and anti-U.S. sentiment on the Korean Peninsula.
53
For
instance, many Chinese politicians and analysts think that more threatening to
them are the Taiwanese, not the North Koreans.
54
The North Korean threat is
seen primarily in the context of the potential to create a regional nuclear arms
race that might eventually lead to a nuclear-armed Taiwan. Similarly, South
Korean security experts increasingly express concern over the impact of the
North Korean factor on Japan’s path to a “normal state.”
55
A former Japanese
diplomat puts it most succinctly by pointing out that regional perception of
North Korean threat is to a large degree a function of regional security
dynamics.
56
51
Yuan, “The Bush Doctrine,” p. 121.
52
Piao, 2003.
53
Interview, Beijing, China, April 22, 2005; Interview, Beijing, China, April 29, 2005.
54
Interview, November 10, 2004; Interview, November 11, 2004; Interview, November
16, 2004; Interview, November 22, 2004; Interview, November 23, 2004 in Beijing, China.
55
A South Korean security expert of a government-affiliated think tank even observed
that North Korean provocations have been speeding up Japan’s path to a normal state
that goes beyond the constitutional constraints about ten years faster than it might have
progressed. Interview No. 2, May 13, 2005, Seoul, Korea.
56
Interview, September 28, 2004, Tokyo, Japan.
Convention