would lose all of its coalition partners. The level of support will fluctuate somewhat in between the two
extremes.
Driving Factor #2: Success in Iraq
Rating: Extremely Significant and Minimal Certainty (A3)
Success or failure in Iraq will most likely have an extremely significant effect on the evolution
and support of the Bush Doctrine. For this analysis, success means that Iraq is stable enough to form its
own government and provide its own security to the point that the United States can commit to a large
scale withdrawal of forces. Failure is when the United States continues to maintain over $100,000
soldiers just to maintain the critical functions that a state would normally be able to provide itself, such as
domestic security.
In January of 2005, numerous Iraqis “embraced democracy in large numbers, standing in long
lines to vote in defiance of mortar attacks and suicide bombers.”
The successful turnout spread hope
throughout the world that Iraq could become a symbol of democracy in the Middle East. Since the
removal of Saddam’s regime there have been many significant gains in Iraq. Kurds who were gassed by
Saddam’s regime in the north and Shias who were brutalized in the south no longer fear his retribution.
Iraq is slowly turning toward democracy, even if with uncertainty, upheaval and no guarantee of
success.
Since the removal of the regime, the United States and its coalition partners have focused on
reconstruction. Although reconstruction aid has been delayed in part by security concerns, with just $2.4
billion of $18 billion spent so far, 2,400 schools, clinics, and fire stations have been rehabilitated, and
electrical, water and telecommunications systems have been improved.
The key to the success of Iraq rests in the ability of the US and its partners to establish an
effective Iraqi security and police force. It is only when security is achieved that improvements in
economic, political, and social infrastructure can be made. There is no doubt that the Bush administration
is committed to the reconstruction of Iraq, however, the form and shape of Iraqi democracy is yet to be
seen.
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