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Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40788_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Shapiro, Jacob. "Terrorist Organization Vulnerabilities and Efficiencies" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC, Sep 01, 2005 <Not Available>. 2011-03-14 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40788_index.html>

Shapiro, J. N. , 2005-09-01 "Terrorist Organization Vulnerabilities and Efficiencies" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-03-14 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40788_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: This chapter uses a rational choice approach to examine the political economy of terrorist financing. To date, much of the theoretical literature and almost all of the government-sponsored reports literature discuss terrorist organizations as though they are made up of ideologically driven purists who share a uniform commitment to the cause. This assumption is needed to explain how these organizations can both: (1) efficiently distribute funds; and (2) operate covertly without the checks and balances most organizations require. Upon closer inspection, one often sees substantial differences in the preferences of key players in terrorist networks. Two selection processes explain why these differences exist and a principal-agent framework shows how these differences lead to inefficiencies in terrorist financial systems. Terrorist organizations face a trade-off between the inefficiency and employing strategies that create vulnerabilities. Government can undertake specific actions to make this trade-off more problematic.

The Organization of Terror: Patterns of Recruitment, Allegiance, and Support Networks in Terrorist Groups

The Influence of Social Network Members� Prejudice on Durability and Political Impactfulness of Individual-level Prejudice

Influence of Social Network Members� Prejudice on Durability and Impactfulness of Individual-level Prejudice