Leaders and Laggards: Who Signs the NPT?
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spurring the NPT. The identities of the NPT “laggards” identified by our model support
this interpretation.
Finally, we leave for future research the question of time-period specific effects on
the functioning of the NPT. Early in the regime’s history, nuclear energy was perceived as
a great economic boon that would help solve the world’s energy problems and provide
poorer countries with a source of abundant, cheap, and safe electricity. In later decades, it
became apparent that these expectations had been over-optimistic, and nuclear energy’s
economic appeal declined. The practical consequence of this development was to change
the costs and benefits of the core NPT bargain. In addition, early in regime’s life nuclear
weapons were often perceived as a marker of modernity, something that conferred status
and prestige upon their possessors. Towards the end of the century, the symbolic meaning
of nuclear weapons had changed: now their pursuit was seen as a marker of “rogueness”
and nuclear forbearance was seen by many as a marker of maturity and modernity. This
change too may have changed the relative attractiveness of the NPT bargain for many
states.
What are the policy implications of our findings? First, we suggest that in order to
strengthen the treaty its basic bargain needs to be reaffirmed. While the promise of nuclear
technology -- power too cheap to meter -- has not been fulfilled, there are several fields in
which the application of this technology could greatly benefit developing countries.
Supporters of the treaty should not hesitate to continue cooperation with adequate
safeguards. Second, this implies that proposals that would dilute this basic bargain may
weaken incentives to continue adherence. Thus recent US proposals to cut off nuclear
cooperation may severely undermine the treaty.
Convention