25
47
Al Qaeda reportedly followed a pattern similar to this through the September 11th attacks. See: "Staff Statement
No. 15: Overview of the Enemy," (National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004), 11.
48
By the selection argument, the individual’s weight on wages is likely to be larger than his weight on impact. Even
if that condition does not hold, all that is required is that the marginal increase in impact times the weight and
probability on impact is less than the marginal increase in wages times the weight and probability on wages.
49
This is where it becomes important that fund raising related to impact is not the sole source of money to many
groups of concern.
50
Many observers argue that al Qaeda no longer exercises the centralized control over finances indicated by the al
Zawahiri quote. Since al Qaeda is widely considered to be resource-rich, this change dovetails nicely with the
analysis.
51
More opportunities for Bayesian updating. The more such opportunities leaders have, the closer their beliefs come
to the true relationship.
52
Cullison, "Inside Al Qaeda's Hard Drive."
53
For example, JI recruits within existing social networks and encourages intermarriage among members’ families.
"Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Ngruki Network in Indonesia," in Indonesia Briefing (International
Crisis Group, 2002). See also "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous."
54
Lisa C. Caroll, "Alternative Remittance Systems Distinguishing Sub-Systems of Ethnic Money Laundering in
Interpol Member Countries on the Asian Continent," (Interpol, 2004), 9.
55
For example, Osama bin Laden’s family has not been aggressively tracked or pursued since 9/11.
56
An example of this dynamic is how the IRA suffered a substantial loss in popularity after the Omagh bombings.
Bueno de Mesquita, "Conciliation, Counter-Terrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence: A Comparative Study of
Five Cases", 22.
57
This scenario matches the Palestinian case where the Israeli public has become accustomed to terror attacks.
Consistent with this theory, I have been unable to find evidence that Palestinian groups rely on trust-inducing
relationships.
58
Al-Aksa Martyr’s Brigades, for example, make payments to planners and bomb-makers after attacks. Ehrenfeld,
Funding Evil: How Terrorism Is Financed and How to Stop It 92-93.
59
“Testimony of FBI Agent John Anticev on Odeh,” United States of America v. Usama bin Laden, et. al., 5 (7) 98
Cr. 1023, 27 February 2001, 1630-1638. See also Brian Michael Jenkins, Countering Al Qaeda (Santa Monica:
RAND, 2002), 5. Groups may also require recruits to demonstrate their commitment by participating in violent
actions before they join. See Sun-Ki Chai, "An Organizational Economics Theory of Antigovernment Violence,"
Comparative Politics 26, no. 1 (1993): 103.
60
News accounts of al Qaeda’s greater decentralization since the United States began an aggressive world-wide
campaign may indicate a choice to trade security for efficiency.
Convention