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Bayesian Decision-Makers Confront the Power Cycle: A Formal Model
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Problem, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2004.
15
E. J. Mundell, “Now for Some Real Monkey Business: Money-hungry Capuchins Are Helping Explain Human
Behaviors,” Health Day, August 15, 2005 (accessed at: healthscout.com/news/1/527108/main.html). Sarah F. Brosnon, Frans B. M. de Waal, “Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay,” Nature, September 18, 2003, 425, pp. 297-299.
16
Pratt, John W., Howard Raiffa and Robert Shlaifer. Introduction to Statistical Decision Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1995).
17
On the strategic reliance of “misperception,” see James D. Morrow, “The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling,
Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics,” Chapter III, eds. David A. Lake and Robert Powell, Strategic Choice and International Relations, 1999, p. 110.
18
Nazli Chouchri and Thomas Robinson, eds. Forecasting in International Relations, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1978;
Brian Pollins, “Global Political Order, Economic Change and Armed Conflict:Co-evolving Systems and the Use of Force,” American Political Science Review, Vol: 90, No. 1, pp. 103-117.
19
At the heart of the notion of hierarchic equilibrium developed by Manus Midlarsky, is the presence of alliance and
coalition, and of power inequality, among states. It should be quite easy to test the interactive effect of power cycle theory and of hierarchic equilibrium theory in terms of the impact of stability at the critical points. Since the number of critical points on the power cycles of the major states is very finite and historically specific, and the coalitional arrangements at each critical interval are also known historically and empirically, the task of comparing the degree of stability across critical points and across varying conditions of polarization and of coalitional size, all could be tested with fascinating potential results. In particular, the contrast between the degree of hierarchy in the normal intervals of statecraft and in the critical intervals of abrupt structural change ought to be fully explored. Manus Midlarsky, “Hierarchical Equilibria and the Long-run Instability of Multipolar Systems,” in Manus Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989, pp. 55-82; “A Hierarchical Equilibrium Theory of Systemic War,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30, 1986, pp. 77-105.
20
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Principals of International Politics, Washington, D.C., CQ Press, 2000, p. 499.
21
See Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000.
22
Nazli Chouchri, Robert C. North, and Susumu Yamakage, The Challenge of Japan Before World War II and After: A
Study of National Growth and Expansion, London: Routledge, 1992.
23
Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991, p.
308.
24
Consider this perception as expressed in the growth of empire. Michael A. Doyle, Empires, Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1986, p. 349.
25
Claudio Coffi-Revilla and Nicholas Gotts, “Comparative Analysis of Agent-based Social Simulations: GeoSim and
FEARLUS Models,” Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation,” Vol. 6, No. 4; T.R. Cusack, and R.J. Stoll, Explaining Realpolitik: Probing International Relations Theory With Computer Simulation, Boulder:; CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990.
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| | Authors: Doran, Charles F.. and Doran, Kirk. |
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Problem, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2004.
15
E. J. Mundell, “Now for Some Real Monkey Business: Money-hungry Capuchins Are Helping Explain Human
Behaviors,” Health Day, August 15, 2005 (accessed at: healthscout.com/news/1/527108/main.html). Sarah F. Brosnon,
Frans B. M. de Waal, “Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay,” Nature, September 18, 2003, 425, pp. 297-299.
16
Pratt, John W., Howard Raiffa and Robert Shlaifer. Introduction to Statistical Decision Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1995).
17
On the strategic reliance of “misperception,” see James D. Morrow, “The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling,
Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics,” Chapter III, eds. David A. Lake and Robert Powell, Strategic
Choice and International Relations, 1999, p. 110.
18
Nazli Chouchri and Thomas Robinson, eds. Forecasting in International Relations, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1978;
Brian Pollins, “Global Political Order, Economic Change and Armed Conflict:Co-evolving Systems and the Use of Force,”
American Political Science Review, Vol: 90, No. 1, pp. 103-117.
19
At the heart of the notion of hierarchic equilibrium developed by Manus Midlarsky, is the presence of alliance and
coalition, and of power inequality, among states. It should be quite easy to test the interactive effect of power cycle theory
and of hierarchic equilibrium theory in terms of the impact of stability at the critical points. Since the number of critical
points on the power cycles of the major states is very finite and historically specific, and the coalitional arrangements at
each critical interval are also known historically and empirically, the task of comparing the degree of stability across critical
points and across varying conditions of polarization and of coalitional size, all could be tested with fascinating potential
results. In particular, the contrast between the degree of hierarchy in the normal intervals of statecraft and in the critical
intervals of abrupt structural change ought to be fully explored. Manus Midlarsky, “Hierarchical Equilibria and the Long-
run Instability of Multipolar Systems,” in Manus Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies, Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1989, pp. 55-82; “A Hierarchical Equilibrium Theory of Systemic War,” International Studies Quarterly,
Vol. 30, 1986, pp. 77-105.
20
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Principals of International Politics, Washington, D.C., CQ Press, 2000, p. 499.
21
See Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000.
22
Nazli Chouchri, Robert C. North, and Susumu Yamakage, The Challenge of Japan Before World War II and After: A
Study of National Growth and Expansion, London: Routledge, 1992.
23
Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991, p.
308.
24
Consider this perception as expressed in the growth of empire. Michael A. Doyle, Empires, Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1986, p. 349.
25
Claudio Coffi-Revilla and Nicholas Gotts, “Comparative Analysis of Agent-based Social Simulations: GeoSim and
FEARLUS Models,” Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation,” Vol. 6, No. 4; T.R. Cusack, and R.J. Stoll,
Explaining Realpolitik: Probing International Relations Theory With Computer Simulation, Boulder:; CO: Lynne Rienner,
1990.
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