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reasons to expect that most repressive governments will be persuaded directly through international
law to reform.
Finally, we are most skeptical that repressive states, facing degrees of cognitive and social
pressures to conform, adopt human rights reforms through processes of acculturation alone.
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Like
socialization, we do not argue that acculturation processes are irrelevant to all political choices.
They may certainly inform states’ identities, preferences, and interests in important ways (Meyer et
al. 1997). However, we emphasize that “bad” states are characterized by leaders that employ
repression purposively and strategically; acts of terror are accordingly seldom accidental or random
and they often bring high rewards for those that use them. Reforms, consequently, are usually
deliberate and costly, often requiring leaders in power to give up certain authorities and privileges
they have become accustomed to enjoying. Improvements in protection of human rights do not, as a
result, happen tacitly or through simple processes of mimicry without some convincing motivation.
Repressive leaders can certainly reform, but they are unlikely by any stretch of the imagination to
give up repression simply because their neighbors have.
Does it matter that “bad” states do “good” things? Do repressive states reform
when they belong to human rights treaties? How much time does it take for a “bad” state
to internalize the human rights norms to which they make commitments? We are
encouraged that many common and important responses suggest optimism: that legal
commitments matter, that repressive states will commonly reform, and that reform, if it
does not happen right away, can always take place over time, as norms are more and
more internalized. Our arguments have led us to expect the contrary: that “bad” states’
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We distinguish between socialization and acculturation in terms of the degree of
agency at work. Socialization takes place with purposive actors making decisions to
change policies, while acculturation is guided more by imitation in the face of uncertainty.
Convention