3
kind and degree of responsibilities they obligate governments to assume; precision, the
exactitude with which they identify these appropriate and inappropriate behaviors; and
delegation, the level of authority they allocate towards implementation (Abbott and
Snidal 2001). With few exceptions,
3
international human rights laws are soft. They create
legally binding obligations, often with an impressive degree of precision as to what kinds
of behaviors governments are supposed to adopt. Yet they delegate only minimal
authority, generally allocating responsibility for implementation to independent
committees that are relatively powerless to discipline governments that break the rules
(Cleveland 2001; Hafner-Burton 2005).
Even so, it has been argued that soft laws can still affect behavioral change. Soft
laws are frequently dynamic, initiating processes and dialogues that can involve learning
over time, and through learning, belief change about rational or appropriate actions
(Abbott and Snidal 2000). In the opinion of many scholars of international law and
politics, human rights laws in particular are a valuable source of domestic reform. They
can make the world a better place, stopping repression by providing rules and
organizational structures that constrain national sovereignty; a justification and forum for
action that can shape governments’ political interests and beliefs about appropriate
actions; and persuasion of leaders toward belief change over time (Chayes and Chayes
1998; Franck 1988; Lutz and Sikkink 2000). These arguments are important and
plausible.
Human rights laws are many. Among them, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (CCPR) and the International Convention Against Torture and Other
3
See Moravcsik 2000 for discussion of an exception.
Convention