Author's Keywords: Bargaining, costs, rationality, crisis, uncertainty, negotiations, rigidities	Convention Need a solution for abstract management? All Academic can help! Contact us today to find out how our system can help your annual meeting. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
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Chadefaux, Thomas. "Bargaining Rigidities and the Rationality of War" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC, Sep 01, 2005 <Not Available>. 2011-03-14 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40847_index.html>

Chadefaux, T. , 2005-09-01 "Bargaining Rigidities and the Rationality of War" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-03-14 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40847_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Theories of crisis bargaining implausibly assume that negotiations can take place at any time without any cost. Yet when rigidities such as the domestic costs of making concessions or signaling costs, for example, are taken into account, negotiations can become too costly to revise frequently: agreements are sticky and extend for discrete periods of time. Noncontinuous bargains leave the rising state with an opportunity loss, defined as the gains it would obtain if negotiations were updated continuously so as to ensure a perfect fit between the distribution of power and the distribution of benefits. Quick changes in relative power in a dyad and rigidities in the bargaining process can lead the rising actor to anticipate a large opportunity loss between two consecutive bargains, in which case there is no deal that both actors prefer to fighting. Ex ante negotiations can break down into war, even with complete information.

Imposing States: Great Power Competition, International Organisations, and the Re-Shaping of Domestic Politics through Non-State Actors

Regulating E-Commerce: Domestic Sources of State Power and the Role of State-Private Actor Relations