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Bargaining Rigidities and the Rationality of War
Unformatted Document Text:  Bargaining Rigidities and the Rationality of War Thomas Chadefaux 1 University of Michigan Ann Arbor Abstract Theories of crisis bargaining implausibly assume that negotiations can take place at any time without any cost. Yet when rigidities such as the domestic costs of making concessions or signaling costs, for example, are taken into account, negotiations can become too costly to revise frequently: agreements are “sticky” and extend for discrete periods of time. Non- continuous bargains leave the rising state with an “opportunity loss”, defined as the gains it would obtain if negotiations were updated continuously so as to ensure a perfect fit between the distribution of power and the distribution of benefits. Quick changes in relative power in a dyad and rigidities in the bargaining process can lead the rising actor to anticipate a large opportunity loss between two consecutive bargains, in which case there is no deal that both actors prefer to fighting. Ex ante negotiations can break down into war, even with complete information. Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1-4, 2005. 1 Contact information: Thomas Chadefaux, Ph.D. Student, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan. 5700 Haven Hall, 505 South State Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-1045. DRAFT - Comments appreciated.

Authors: Chadefaux, Thomas.
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Bargaining Rigidities and the Rationality of War


Thomas
Chadefaux
1
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor



Abstract
Theories of crisis bargaining implausibly assume that negotiations can take place at any time
without any cost. Yet when rigidities such as the domestic costs of making concessions or
signaling costs, for example, are taken into account, negotiations can become too costly to
revise frequently: agreements are “sticky” and extend for discrete periods of time. Non-
continuous bargains leave the rising state with an “opportunity loss”, defined as the gains it
would obtain if negotiations were updated continuously so as to ensure a perfect fit between
the distribution of power and the distribution of benefits. Quick changes in relative power in a
dyad and rigidities in the bargaining process can lead the rising actor to anticipate a large
opportunity loss between two consecutive bargains, in which case there is no deal that both
actors prefer to fighting. Ex ante negotiations can break down into war, even with complete
information.


Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Washington, D.C., September 1-4, 2005.
1
Contact information: Thomas Chadefaux, Ph.D. Student, Department of Political Science, University of
Michigan. 5700 Haven Hall, 505 South State Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-1045. DRAFT - Comments
appreciated.


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