(ranging from hills and weather to tidal water) are central concerns, sometimes
illustrated by certain well-selected historical battles (see Collins 1998). On the other
hand, we have system-level discussions of geopolitics and structures of the (post-)
Cold War. Here, spheres of ideological influence and strategies of nuclear deterrence
are central themes (cf. Pepper & Jenkins (1985) for a discussion of Cold-War
geopolitics). Neither of these approaches is suitable for a cross-national study for the
entire post-WW II period; the first is inappropriately detailed, the latter allows little
variation between cases.
Diehl (1991) points us in the right direction with his work on the geography of
interstate war. His work emphasizes the importance of territory in war. The
geographic aspects of territory significantly shape the incentives for going to war.
Defending or conquering some land area may be valuable. A given territory may hold
strategic or valuable resources (loot). The population residing there may maintain
special significance (due to factors of ethnicity, religion, etc.). The geography of the
land may also exhibit strategically desirable characteristics. Rough terrain, for
example, may offer good defensive positions for an army. Or controlling a mountain
pass or a sea passage (i.e. a straight) may offer strategic advantages with regard to
transportation and movement of troops. Territory also may possess certain non-
tangible qualities – symbolic value, identity & cohesion – all of which may play a
critical role in recruitment and allegiance to an army. All aspects of territory as
described here are relevant to either civil war or interstate war. The difference occurs
with regard to theory and the way these characteristics are operationalized in large-N
quantitative analyses.
Gates & Buhaug’s (2002) “The Geography of Civil War” demonstrates the
endogenous relationship between the location and the scope of civil conflict. This
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Convention