choice scholars have shown that when there are three or more parties you can have a situation
where every individual policy outcome is preferred by a majority of actors to every other.
In civil war bargaining, this problem manifests itself in the form of shifting alliances. In
negotiations among multiple combatants a range of issues are brought to the table that must be
addressed in a final settlement. Shifting alliances emerge when parties can form different
coalitions on separate issues. This problem is particularly detrimental to multi-party negotiations
because it prevents combatants from forming negotiating blocks to help them reach agreement.
Since war is costly, parties have an incentive to find ways to achieve their goals through
negotiation. One way groups could do this would be for them to ally permanently with others
who had broadly similar goals and form some overarching institution to negotiate. Shifting
alliances prevent groups from achieving such alliances, however, because groups that agree with
each other on one issue often agree with other actors on other issues.
The 1989-1991 negotiations in the Cambodian conflict show the problem of shifting
alliances. Cambodia in 1989 was “ripe for resolution” for a variety of reasons. All four factions
involved in the fighting had lost the support of their external patrons. The conflict was incredibly
costly for all parties and no faction had a realistic chance of winning militarily. The United
Nations Security Council had made peace in Cambodia a priority and agreed to deploy a sizeable
peacekeeping force to oversee the terms of an agreement reached. Finally, the three insurgent
groups had all formed one overarching institution and were nominally allied.
Despite all of these favorable conditions, the peace process still took two years.
Negotiations in Paris in July-August 1989 broke down over two main issues that produced
different coalitions. The three insurgent groups (the Khmer Rouge/PDK, FUNCINPEC and the
KPNLF) all agreed to be part of a power-sharing government with an equal seat for the four
factions, but the government refused to share power with the Khmer Rouge. At the same time,
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Arrow 1951, Condorcet 1785
17
Convention