A License to
Kill
Within existing literature, state authorities are generally depicted as being the protectors
of the status quo. When behavior takes place that threatens the safety of citizens and/or the
security of government personnel, policies and institutions (e.g., demonstrations, acts of
terrorism or civil war), it is expected that relevant political agents will apply repressive behavior
in an effort to eliminate the challenging activity and to restore domestic order (e.g., Walter 1969;
Dallin and Breslauer 1970; Tilly 1978; Duvall and Stohl 1983; Gurr 1986; Lichbach 1995;
Gartner and Regan 1996; Stanley 1996); this is commonly referred to as the “Threat Model” of
state repression (Earl 2003). For over 30 years, quantitative analyses have supported this
relationship. Across time, space, context, measures and statistical methods, dissent has increased
repression in every single investigation of the topic (e.g., Hibbs 1973; Poe and Tate 1994;
Davenport 1995a,b; 1999; 2004; Krain 1997; Moore 1998; Poe et al. 1998; King 1999; Zanger
2000; Harff 2003; Davenport and Armstrong 2004). While this empirical result is relevant to
many areas of political science (e.g., democracy, power and civil society), it is particularly
important for conflict studies because given the consistency of this finding in conjunction with
the varied influence of repression on dissent (e.g., Lichbach 1987; Gupta et al. 1993; Moore
1998), it is likely the case that this represents the only known law in research concerning state-
dissident interactions – what I refer to as the Law of Coercive Monopolization, where dissent
sometimes responds to repression, but repression always respond to dissent.
While impressive in the sheer amount of support that the “Threat Model” has received,
within this article I argue that existing work is misleading because it generally ignores the fact
that repressive behavior could be applied without an overt behavioral challenge being present
(see Snyder [1976] for important exception) or that it significantly exceeds the amount of dissent
that exists at the time under investigation (e.g., see Duvall and Shamir [1980] for important
exception). To qualitative scholars of repressive action (e.g., Walter 1969; Goldstein 1978;
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Convention