19
foreign policy (Zaller 1992; 1994; see Jacobs and Page for a recent summary 2005), a
considerable body of literature suggests a constraining role for public opinion (Jentleson
1992; Brody 1994; Milner 1997; see Holsti 2004 for a recent summary). Citizens are
unl
i
ke
l
y
t
o
r
ef
e
r
e
e
ea
c
h
conf
l
i
c
t
,
but
a
s
Al
dr
i
c
h
e
t
a
l
.
(
1989)
not
e
,
t
hey
a
r
e
not
a
“
bl
i
nd
a
udi
e
nc
e”
.In sum, the magnitude of external pressures on the SFRC—whether arising
from international crises or presidential initiative—puts the committee at a profound
disadvantage in retaining the prestige it derives from the constitutional powers of the
Senate. These stimuli take a variety of forms and differ in their impact over time,
particularly in response to the distribution of partisan preferences inside the chamber. In
the next section, we develop hypotheses and measures that capture the relative
importance of various factors that lead to institutional change.
IV. Hypotheses, Data and Methods
The model of prestige outlined above focuses on the specific actions and reactions
of the president and the SFRC, but there is no systematic way to calculate the weights of
the various moves and countermoves. Instead, we concentrate on broad trends in the
c
ommi
t
t
e
e
’
s
e
xternal environment, as well as internal distribution of partisan preferences,
that a
f
f
ec
t
t
he
c
ommi
t
t
e
e’
s
a
bi
l
i
t
y
t
o
a
s
s
e
r
t
i
t
self in the face of executive dominance. The
e
vol
ut
i
on
of
t
he
c
ommi
t
t
e
e
’
s
j
ur
i
s
di
c
t
i
on,the intensity of conflict in the international
system and the polarization and strength of the parties define a context in which the
struggle over institutional prestige takes place. Taken together, they can exaggerate or
di
mi
ni
s
h
t
he
i
mpa
c
t
of
t
he
e
xt
e
r
na
l
e
ve
nt
s
a
nd
pr
es
i
de
nt
i
a
l
a
c
t
i
ons
on
t
he
commi
t
t
e
e
’
s
status.
A. HYPOTHESES
Convention