2
I. Introduction:
As the United States entered its second year of conflict in Iraq, the chair of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) proposed hearings regarding the conduct
and objectives of the war. House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R, TX) quickly attacked
the proposal for its disloyalty to the Republican Party and its potential harm to President
Bus
h’
s
e
l
ec
t
or
a
l
f
or
t
une
s
.
None
of
t
he
a
dmi
ni
s
t
r
a
t
i
on’
s
t
op-level decision makers agreed
to appear, and only C-SPAN bothered to cover the modest inquiry that eventually took
place in April 2004. The presidential snub and the public scolding from a House member
a
r
e
not
t
he
onl
y
s
i
gns
of
t
he
SFRC’
s
de
c
l
i
ni
ng
pr
es
t
i
ge
.
I
nc
r
ea
s
i
ngl
y,
ve
t
e
r
a
n
s
e
na
t
or
s
avoid service on the committee, and some even have talked about removing it from the
top tier of committee assignments (Deering 2005).
How did one
of
t
he
Congr
e
s
s
’
s
mos
t
ve
ne
r
a
bl
e
i
ns
t
i
t
ut
i
ons
f
a
l
l
on
ha
r
d
t
i
me
s
?
What does the recent experience of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tell us about
institutional change? The internal and external prestige of the committee has declined
steadily since World War II, reflecting not only the inexorable pressures of presidential
dominance in foreign affairs, but also the debilitating effects of party polarization.
Two decades of scholarly research have produced a consensus that legislative
institutions emerge in response to individual and collective goals of members. It follows,
t
he
n,
t
ha
t
c
ha
nge
s
i
n
l
a
wma
ke
r
s
’
pr
e
f
er
e
nc
e
s
ar
e
a
ne
ce
s
s
a
r
y
c
ondi
t
i
on
f
or
i
ns
t
i
t
ut
i
ona
l
adaptation, although Schickler (2001) demonstrates that they are by no means sufficient.
The
r
ea
s
ons
f
or
t
he
c
ommi
t
t
e
e
’
s
a
l
t
e
r
e
d
s
t
a
t
us
r
ema
i
n
unc
l
e
a
r
,
howe
ver
,
be
c
a
us
e
s
c
hol
a
r
s
have no theory for predicting how or why legislators adopt new objectives. Formal
models of legislative institutions typically treat member preferences as given and