All Academic, Inc. Research Logo

Info/CitationFAQResearchAll Academic Inc.
Document

Declining Fortunes: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1946-2004
Unformatted Document Text:  2 I. Introduction: As the United States entered its second year of conflict in Iraq, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) proposed hearings regarding the conduct and objectives of the war. House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R, TX) quickly attacked the proposal for its disloyalty to the Republican Party and its potential harm to President Bus h’ s e l ec t or a l f or t une s . None of t he a dmi ni s t r a t i on’ s t op-level decision makers agreed to appear, and only C-SPAN bothered to cover the modest inquiry that eventually took place in April 2004. The presidential snub and the public scolding from a House member a r e not t he onl y s i gns of t he SFRC’ s de c l i ni ng pr es t i ge . I nc r ea s i ngl y, ve t e r a n s e na t or s avoid service on the committee, and some even have talked about removing it from the top tier of committee assignments (Deering 2005). How did one of t he Congr e s s ’ s mos t ve ne r a bl e i ns t i t ut i ons f a l l on ha r d t i me s ? What does the recent experience of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tell us about institutional change? The internal and external prestige of the committee has declined steadily since World War II, reflecting not only the inexorable pressures of presidential dominance in foreign affairs, but also the debilitating effects of party polarization. Two decades of scholarly research have produced a consensus that legislative institutions emerge in response to individual and collective goals of members. It follows, t he n, t ha t c ha nge s i n l a wma ke r s ’ pr e f er e nc e s ar e a ne ce s s a r y c ondi t i on f or i ns t i t ut i ona l adaptation, although Schickler (2001) demonstrates that they are by no means sufficient. The r ea s ons f or t he c ommi t t e e ’ s a l t e r e d s t a t us r ema i n unc l e a r , howe ver , be c a us e s c hol a r s have no theory for predicting how or why legislators adopt new objectives. Formal models of legislative institutions typically treat member preferences as given and

Authors: Fowler, Linda. and Law, R. Brian.
first   previous   Page 2 of 49   next   last



background image
2
I. Introduction:
As the United States entered its second year of conflict in Iraq, the chair of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) proposed hearings regarding the conduct
and objectives of the war. House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R, TX) quickly attacked
the proposal for its disloyalty to the Republican Party and its potential harm to President
Bus
h’
s
e
l
ec
t
or
a
l
f
or
t
une
s
.
None
of
t
he
a
dmi
ni
s
t
r
a
t
i
on’
s
t
op-level decision makers agreed
to appear, and only C-SPAN bothered to cover the modest inquiry that eventually took
place in April 2004. The presidential snub and the public scolding from a House member
a
r
e
not
t
he
onl
y
s
i
gns
of
t
he
SFRC’
s
de
c
l
i
ni
ng
pr
es
t
i
ge
.
I
nc
r
ea
s
i
ngl
y,
ve
t
e
r
a
n
s
e
na
t
or
s
avoid service on the committee, and some even have talked about removing it from the
top tier of committee assignments (Deering 2005).
How did one
of
t
he
Congr
e
s
s
s
mos
t
ve
ne
r
a
bl
e
i
ns
t
i
t
ut
i
ons
f
a
l
l
on
ha
r
d
t
i
me
s
?
What does the recent experience of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tell us about
institutional change? The internal and external prestige of the committee has declined
steadily since World War II, reflecting not only the inexorable pressures of presidential
dominance in foreign affairs, but also the debilitating effects of party polarization.
Two decades of scholarly research have produced a consensus that legislative
institutions emerge in response to individual and collective goals of members. It follows,
t
he
n,
t
ha
t
c
ha
nge
s
i
n
l
a
wma
ke
r
s
pr
e
f
er
e
nc
e
s
ar
e
a
ne
ce
s
s
a
r
y
c
ondi
t
i
on
f
or
i
ns
t
i
t
ut
i
ona
l
adaptation, although Schickler (2001) demonstrates that they are by no means sufficient.
The
r
ea
s
ons
f
or
t
he
c
ommi
t
t
e
e
s
a
l
t
e
r
e
d
s
t
a
t
us
r
ema
i
n
unc
l
e
a
r
,
howe
ver
,
be
c
a
us
e
s
c
hol
a
r
s
have no theory for predicting how or why legislators adopt new objectives. Formal
models of legislative institutions typically treat member preferences as given and


Convention
All Academic Convention can solve the abstract management needs for any association's annual meeting.
Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf.
Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets!
Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more!
Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering.
Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more!
Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches!
Click here for more information.

first   previous   Page 2 of 49   next   last

©2008 All Academic, Inc.