4
nevertheless constrain the behavior of members. Institutions c
a
n
be
“
s
t
i
c
ky”
be
ca
us
e
existing rules hinder the creation of coalitions for new rules. Insoluble collective action
problems, moreover, prevent members from crafting new institutions that respond to the
challenges of outside events and actors.
In addition, external pressures vary in their institutional impact, depending upon
t
he
c
ohe
r
e
nc
e
of
t
he
membe
r
s
’
pol
i
cy
pr
ef
e
r
e
nces
.
Pa
r
t
y-based theories of institutional
arrangements predict that rules empowering parties will be strongest when fellow
partisans agree among themselves and disagree with the opposition (Cox and McCubbins
1993; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Schickler and Rich 1997; Maltzman 1997;
Schickler 2000; Aldrich and Rohde 2001). The conditional party government that arises
from partisan polarization, in turn, leads to vigorous legislative majorities able to work
their will. Yet, the ability to pass bills is not necessarily the hallmark of a potent
legislature, for strong, disciplined parties historically have strengthened the hand of the
president in dealing with Congress (Sundquist 1981; Whittington and Carpenter 2003).
The greater the divisions between the parties, in short, the more difficult it can be for
members to unite in defense of legislative prerogatives vis a` vis the executive. The few
cases of bipartisan coalitions identified in Schickler (2001) supporting institutional
change have organized around measures to promote individual influence. An exception
i
s
t
he
pa
s
s
age
of
t
he
budge
t
a
r
y
a
nd
f
or
e
i
gn
pol
i
cy
r
e
f
or
ms
i
n
1973
i
n
r
e
s
pons
e
t
o
Ni
xon’
s
“
i
mpe
r
i
a
l
pr
e
s
i
de
ncy,
”
but
i
t
i
s
not
e
wor
t
hy
t
ha
t
i
nt
e
r
na
l
pa
r
t
y
di
s
c
i
pl
i
ne
was
a
t
i
t
s
na
di
r
during this period (c.f. McCarty et al 2001; Ansolabehere et al. 2001).
Research on party polarization has dealt primarily with the House and has focused
on policy outcomes, particularly the incidence of gridlock, with respect to the passage of
Convention