9
arise through informal processes are also important (c.f. North 1990), but receive less
attention from scholars.
Scholars have begun to model the interaction between Congress and the president,
but
t
hey,
t
oo,
de
pe
nd
upon
t
he
gi
ve
n
pr
e
f
e
r
e
nc
e
s
of
i
ndi
vi
dua
l
a
c
t
or
s
.
Thus
Ca
me
r
on’
s
(2000) predictions of when presidents will veto legislation and when they will succeed
rests on exogenously determined ideal points among members of Congress in relation to
t
he
pr
e
s
i
de
nt
’
s
pr
e
f
er
r
e
d
out
c
ome
.
Si
mi
l
a
r
l
y,
Howe
l
l
’
s
(
2003)
a
na
l
ys
i
s
of
t
he
l
i
ke
l
i
hood
that presidents will exploit their institutional
a
dva
nt
a
ge
a
s
“f
i
r
s
t
move
r
”
i
n
i
s
s
ui
ng
e
xe
c
ut
i
ve
or
de
r
s
de
pe
nds
upon
t
he
s
i
ze
a
nd
l
oc
a
t
i
on
of
t
he
“gr
i
dl
oc
k
i
nt
e
r
val
,
”
whi
c
h
reflects the distribution of party and chamber medians in comparison to the status quo. In
effect, both authors develop strategies for the two branches by assuming a stable
framework of institutional power and a set of exogenously induced preferences. Given
t
he
a
c
c
umul
a
t
i
on
of
c
our
t
c
a
s
e
s
e
mbr
a
c
i
ng
e
xe
c
ut
i
ve
di
s
c
r
e
t
i
on,
t
he
ne
ws
me
di
a
’
s
preoccupation with the White House, and the altered expectations of both presidents and
legislators about their role in the policy process, this is a strong assumption, indeed.
In the domain of foreign affairs, the power of external influences is particularly
e
vi
de
nt
.
Fe
nno’
s
(
1973)
s
t
udy
of
c
ommi
t
t
ees in Congress revealed that the executive
branch so dominated what was then the House Foreign Affairs Committee that a major
c
ommi
t
t
e
e
obj
e
c
t
i
ve
wa
s
t
o
pe
r
s
ua
de
s
ke
pt
i
c
a
l
c
ol
l
e
ague
s
t
o
pa
s
s
t
he
pr
e
s
i
de
nt
’
s
f
or
e
i
gn
aid package (1973, 69-73). For the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with its
constitutional prerogatives as agent of the Senate and its prestige as the top-ranked
committee (when Fenno published his study), the environment was less monolithic, and
me
mbe
r
s
di
s
pl
ayed
a
s
e
ns
e
t
ha
t
“
Se
na
t
e
opi
ni
on may contend with executive opinion
Convention