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Parliamentary Party Switching in the Ukrainian Rada, 1998-2002
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Table 3: Party Choice-Specific Results for Model of Party Selection Uncorrected
Model
Corrected
Model
Independent
Variables
Coef.,
(R.S.E.)
Marg.
Effects
Coef.,
(R.S.E.)
Marg.
Effects
Vote Previous Election
-0.7056*
-0.1390
6.2393***
0.0056
(0.3172) (0.7190)
Pro-Presidential Party (1,0)
-0.0115*
-0.0023
2.0067***
0.0028
(0.0540) (0.1452)
Distance
-0.9543* -0.1880 -0.4895*** -0.0004
(0.0651) (0.1091)
Party Membership
0.0017*
0.0003
-0.0124***
0.0001
(0.0010) (0.0027)
Party
Cohesion
0.4210* 0.0829 0.6734*** 0.0006
(0.0624) (0.1407)
Number of Observations
50919
50919
Log Pseudo-likelihood
-9911.373
-5903.04
Probability > Χ
2
0.000
0.000
McFadden’s R
2
0.183
0.51
McFadden’s Adjusted R
2
0.175
0.499
Count R
2
0.283
0.602
***p ≤ .01, **p ≤ .05, *p ≤ .1 Notes: The equations were estimated with a conditional fixed-effects logit model. The corrected model includes the inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage population-average probit model. The dependent variable in each model indicated a deputy’s parliamentary party choice at the end of the legislative session. The marginal effects represent the probability of a positive outcome for each continuous variable at its mean level and for each dummy variable the change from going from 0 to 1. Robust standard errors calculated clustering on individual deputies. Results from natural cubic splines not reported.
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28
Table 3: Party Choice-Specific Results for Model of Party Selection
Uncorrected
Model
Corrected
Model
Independent
Variables
Coef.,
(R.S.E.)
Marg.
Effects
Coef.,
(R.S.E.)
Marg.
Effects
Vote Previous Election
-0.7056*
-0.1390
6.2393***
0.0056
(0.3172) (0.7190)
Pro-Presidential Party (1,0)
-0.0115*
-0.0023
2.0067***
0.0028
(0.0540) (0.1452)
Distance
-0.9543* -0.1880 -0.4895*** -0.0004
(0.0651) (0.1091)
Party Membership
0.0017*
0.0003
-0.0124***
0.0001
(0.0010) (0.0027)
Party
Cohesion
0.4210* 0.0829 0.6734*** 0.0006
(0.0624) (0.1407)
Number of Observations
50919
50919
Log Pseudo-likelihood
-9911.373
-5903.04
Probability > Χ
2
0.000
0.000
McFadden’s R
2
0.183
0.51
McFadden’s Adjusted R
2
0.175
0.499
Count R
2
0.283
0.602
***p ≤ .01, **p ≤ .05, *p ≤ .1
Notes: The equations were estimated with a conditional fixed-effects logit model. The corrected
model includes the inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage population-average probit model. The
dependent variable in each model indicated a deputy’s parliamentary party choice at the end of
the legislative session. The marginal effects represent the probability of a positive outcome for
each continuous variable at its mean level and for each dummy variable the change from going
from 0 to 1. Robust standard errors calculated clustering on individual deputies. Results from
natural cubic splines not reported.
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