National Security, Neoinstitutionalism, and Intragovernmental Regulation:
Lessons from the Greening of the U.S. Military
Abstract
One of the most understudied aspects of executive politics involves issues regarding
intragovernmental regulation: cases where the activities of public entities fall within the
regulatory responsibilities of other public entities. Absent, in particular, have been systematic
and empirically rigorous efforts to track longitudinally the dynamics and outcomes of
intragovernmental regulation and to cull from these observations the rudiments of an empirically
grounded theory of intragovernmental regulation. This exploratory study analyzes four instances
of intragovernmental regulation related to greening the U.S. military during the Clinton and Bush
administrations with the aims of (1) chronicling what can happen, and why, in the
intragovernmental regulatory arena, and (2) assessing the explanatory and predictive power of
rational choice institutionalism in this policy arena. Analysis of the cases illustrates the strengths
of rational choice institutionalism when applied to intragovernmental regulation, as well as
potential areas for refinement, elaboration, and extension.
Convention