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reduction in CO2 emissions would be necessary just to stabilize atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases (IPCC 1996). Second, international negotiators
agreed that any legal instrument to come out of the formal negotiations scheduled for
Kyoto, Japan, in 1997 would impose emissions reductions only on developed countries.
To diminish the impact of these developments the fossil-fuel-based industry
leaders undertook another round of outside lobbying. They challenged the idea of
exempting developing countries, pointing out those countries were deforesting their land,
thereby eliminating carbon sinks, and in the future would be the major carbon emitters.
Furthermore, industry spokesmen argued, such an approach would put U.S. businesses at
a competitive disadvantage and prompt jobs to move overseas. The Coalition for Vehicle
Choice, a Washington-based group financed by the U.S. auto industry, initiated a
campaign to recruit white-hat allies by convincing small business, labor, and local civic
groups throughout the U.S. that the Kyoto Protocol would be “bad for America.”
Similarly, the Center for Energy and Economic development, whose $4 million annual
budget was furnished by the coal industry, targeted business and civic groups in eleven
states and forged an alliance with the United Mine Workers union, which also opposed
the treaty.
Industry arguments fell on receptive ears in Congress: the 1994 elections had
produced Republican majorities in both the House and Senate, and industry’s skepticism
about the Kyoto Protocol provided political cover for conservative Republicans to pursue
their ideological preferences. Newly elevated leaders immediately moved to reinforce
efforts to undermine climate change science. For instance, in September 1995 California
Republican Representative Dana Rohrabacher convened a series of subcommittee
hearings entitled “Scientific Integrity and the Public Trust,” whose purpose was to
highlight skeptical views and thereby discredit mainstream climate change science in
general and the IPCC in particular. Similarly, hearings held by the House Science
Committee in March 1996 to determine the budget for U.S. climate change research
featured three prominent skeptics: Patrick Michaels, Robert Balling, and S. Fred Singer.
Even environmentally concerned members of Congress felt compelled to respond to
industry’s widely publicized arguments. On June 12, 1997 the Senate unanimously
passed a nonbinding resolution, the Byrd-Hagel amendment, which echoed industry’s
Convention