concrete limits on presidential powers in order to prevent the regime from slipping into a
personalistic form of authoritarian rule, or “caudillismo.”
Cooperation among elites in an authoritarian regime also depends to some degree
upon the level of transparency within the state hierarchy. As noted in the previous
section, perhaps the most self-destructive pathology common to authoritarian regimes is
the lack of reliable information about the functions of state institutions. Aggravated
principle-agent problems lie at the root of administrative abuse and corruption in
authoritarian regimes. But more fundamentally, the absence of reliable information on
state functions can mask the emergence of power centers that can challenge the authority
of the central regime. Moreover, lack of transparency typically feeds the paranoia and
uncertainly that is often endemic among key players within authoritarian regimes. This
uncertainty encourages factions to seize power as a defensive move, before their rivals
beat them to the punch. This problem is acute within newly formed regimes with low
levels of institutionalization. Conscious of the fragility of authoritarian coalitions and the
distinct possibility of a regime cannibalizing itself, some regimes adopt judicial
institutions as a way of generating an independent stream of information on the functions
of the state’s own institutions. Once again, the Egyptian case is instructive. Both Nasser
and Sadat came to the conclusion that centralized modes of monitoring did not produce
reliable information about the conduct of the state’s own administrative hierarchy and
they both became concerned that they would fall victim to the emergence of “power
centers,” particularly within the military, the police, and the intelligence services.
76
Thomas Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1988). According to Skidmore, “by codifying the arbitrary powers they considered necessary…” President
Branco attempted to “…forestall future recourse to even more arbitrary measures.” (Skidmore, 57). Alfred
Stepan makes the similar argument in The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1971).
77
Rosberg provides numerous examples of how rivals in the Egyptian state, such as the head of the
Egyptian army, Abdel Hakim ‘Amer, attempted to wield more influence through interfering in a variety of
state institutions including public sector enterprises and the press. See Rosberg, 83-104.
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Convention