that judicial politics in authoritarian regimes is often far more complex than we
commonly understand. To be sure, the dynamics at play in these regimes are by no
means the same as judicial politics in liberal democracies (though they are far more
similar than we are often led to believe). The cases reviewed here reveal that
authoritarian rulers often times make use of judicial institutions to counteract the
dysfunctions that plague bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. However, the introduction
of independent administrative or constitutional courts does not advance regime interests
in a straightforward manner. Rather, it opens a space for activists to mobilize against the
state and synergistic alliances form with judges wishing to expand their mandate and
affect political reform. Authoritarian rulers work to contain judicial activism through
providing incentives that favor judicial self-restraint, engineering fragmented judicial
systems, constraining access to justice, and incapacitating judicial support networks.
However, those efforts are never completely effective. Instead, a lively arena of
contention emerges in what we typically imagine to be the least likely environment for
the judicialization of politics – the authoritarian state.
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Convention