as stepping stones to more influential positions. Domingo (2000, 722) examines the
career paths of Supreme Court judges, and finds that there is a high rate of turnover in the
court. Magaloni (2003, 290) notes that 23% of outgoing Supreme Court justices
occupied significant positions immediately after leaving the court. High turnover rates
increase the influence of the executive because he can pack the court when seats are
emptied. Also, when the Supreme Court becomes a stepping-stone for the politically
ambitious, the President exerts influence over seated justices who are hoping to gain a
better political appointment in the future. Since political competition began to emerge in
the 1980s, salaries for justices and judicial budgets have increased significantly
(Domingo 2000, 716). These types of changes help to improve the prestige of a judicial
career, reduce corruption, and generate more independence from the executive. When
judges are poorly paid they are more apt to accept bribes, and they are also more likely to
be looking to the executive for a better-paid job. Thus, judicial budgets provide a good
indicator of judicial independence.
The institutional arguments have focused mostly on explaining the independence
of the supreme court, though political leaders may seek a more effective and accessible
judiciary in the context of intense political competition if there are overwhelming
demands for reform from the electorate (Negretto and Ungar 1997). Increasing electoral
competition allows the electorate to choose candidates who pay more attention to the
demands of the voters. Under one-party rule, PRI candidates won elections even if they
did not have the support of the electorate. With multi-party elections, there are new
incentives for the party in power to address the concerns of the electorate in order to
improve their party’s chances for reelection. Democratization also generated new
expectations of less corrupt government, and the dramatic increase in common crime has
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Convention