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Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p41179_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Filippov, Mikhail. "Federalism and Russian Democracy: Is There a Positive Relationship Between Federalism and Successful Transition to Democracy?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC, Sep 01, 2005 <Not Available>. 2011-03-14 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p41179_index.html>

Filippov, M. G. , 2005-09-01 "Federalism and Russian Democracy: Is There a Positive Relationship Between Federalism and Successful Transition to Democracy?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-03-14 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p41179_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: I draw some implications from Riker’s federal theory to analyze the uneasy connection between federalism and transition to democracy. Specifically, I deal with the question of whether federalism as a constitutional form has a positive effect on the democratic transition in general, and on the pervasiveness of democratically structured political competition. My main conclusion is that institutions of federalism are fundamentally incompatible with intermediate values of the quality of democracy such as found in most transitions. In light of that argument, it is fully consistent that reduction in democratic standards in Russia coincided with increasing centralization of governmental functions through the building of the “vertical of power,” needed, as the Kremlin officials frequently argue, to protect the country’s territorial integrity. Much of the general theoretical literature on federalism and democracy claims as an empirical fact that federalism is beneficial for democratic development, especially in large and diverse societies. This may be because all large and democratic countries are, indeed, constitutional federations. Yet it is also true that the number of successful democratic federations is fairly small and even smaller is the number of successful multiethnic federations. Also, there must be a distinction drawn between established democratic political systems and democratic transitions. In this paper I argue that there exists bi-modality in the democratic tendency under conditions of constitutional federalism. I seek to extend Riker’s theory of federalism and the model of federal enforcement in Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova (2004) which both deal exclusively with democracies, and to admit other than democratic institutional solutions. What results is a theoretical prediction of such bi-modality where, in order to preserve territorial integrity and federalism, the quality of democratic political competition has to be either very high, or very low, with severe restrictions of the democratic process. Out of the two, only the high-quality democratic solution ensures the robustness of the federal form. Basically, the reason for this bi-modality is that a low-quality or very new democracy cannot generate from its midst the thing that is needed in order to contain the sort of disruptive distributive bargaining that the federal form tends to provoke – strong political parties engaging in a meaningful nation-wide electoral competition.

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