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1. I add to the models controls for political ideology and partisanship. The results are presented
in Table 2.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
In contexts of black economic disadvantage, African Americans are not only more likely
to harbor negative stereotypes about Latinos, they are also more reluctant to support the use of
preferences in the hiring of Latinos to the same degree that they support such preferences for
blacks. In the model predicting the level of in-group favoritism on affirmative action in hiring
and promotion, the coefficients on Latino educational and poverty advantage are each positive
and statistically significant at the five-percent level. Similar to the patterns observed earlier, the
sensitivity to economic disparity is conditional on the size of the Latino population, as illustrated
more clearly in Figure 3. Where Latinos constitute only 14 percent of the neighborhood
population, increases in the group’s educational or poverty advantage are associated with only
small increases in the degree of in-group favoritism. At 51 percent of the population, an increase
in the Latino educational advantage widens the gap between support for black preferences and
support for Latino preferences by a more considerable amount; for every one standard deviation
increase in the educational advantage, the level of policy favoritism also increases by a standard
deviation. The sensitivity to disparities in poverty rates increases with the size of the Latino
population as well, but the graphs make clear that these effects are trivially small.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
In contrast to its effect on the gap in support for preferential hiring, the relative status of
blacks and Latinos has no statistically significant effect on whether African Americans support
the extension of educational assistance to Latinos as strongly as they support similar efforts
targeted at blacks. As indicated by the coefficients and standard errors on three of the four
Convention