28
virtually equal the negative effect that new cohorts as a group are subject to.
36
Our findings, while persuasive, still leave unanswered questions. Though they dovetail
nicely with those of Plutzer (2002) and of Hillygus (2005), suggesting that length of residence is
the precondition that makes it possible for personal contacts to enable young adults to learn the
habit of voting, still one would like to be able to 'connect the dots' by including questions in
successive future National Election Studies that ask whether individuals were made aware of the
vote intentions of acquaintances, family, and friends.
37
A more elaborate set of questions might
not only ask whether this had occurred, but might also ask whether respondents had themselves
initiated the contacts that led them to being expressively engaged by those individuals. Such
questions might help to determine whether learning to vote is ever a self-motivated matter, rather
than just a response to the mobilizing efforts of others.
The title of this paper is deliberately ambiguous on this point. Being known by name
could lead people to feel an obligation to those with whom they have connections, or the link
could (as I have assumed) go the other way. But, in either case, it is the lack of anonymity that is
important. For others to know who you are is apparently critical if, as a new voter, you are going
to make the transition to habitual voting. Lack of anonymity is also the factor that invalidates the
primary assumption responsible for the so-called "turnout paradox" (Grofman 1993).
38
Anonymous individuals can freeload on the efforts of others. They have no incentive to vote
when returns to themselves as individuals are so small. Once anonymity is broken, however, and
individuals see themselves as members of social groups that might be influenced by their
behavior, the calculus of voting is quite different.
The anonymous individual has no reason to vote unless he or she has already acquired the
habit of voting. But the person whose name is known, within a supportive network of friends and
acquaintances expressively engaged with one-another on the subject of their vote intentions,
needs a very good excuse for not voting.
36
Calculated by taking 0.051 + 0.287 = 0.338, as compared to the negative 0.342 mentioned in Note 32.
37
In the present battery of questions about approaches made to voters, the closest is a question that simply
asks whether any "other" approaches were made.
38
This is the assumption that potential voters lack knowledge of what other potential voters will do, an
assumption that makes it irrational for individuals to take account of the rewards of voting (since those
rewards will be enjoyed whether the individual votes or not). Yet people do vote, giving rise to a turnout
paradox that does not seem quite so paradoxical when voters are seen as socially connected individuals
who are forthcoming about their vote intentions.
Convention