1
This should not be interpreted to suggest that Canadian parties do not have any of the characteristics Katz and Mair
attribute to cartel parties. In fact, long before the advent of state subsidies Canadian parties had relatively small
memberships, limited role for members in determining public policy, and – at least in the case of the Liberal Party of
Canada – a tendency to periodically blur the boundaries between party and state. See Young (1998).
2
In the spring of 2005, it appeared that the Liberal Party’s precarious minority government would be defeated by the
combined efforts of the Conservative Party and Bloc Quebecois. In the weeks immediately prior to the government’s
anticipated defeat on a confidence motion in the House of Commons, Prime Minister Paul Martin addressed the nation and
promised to call an election within a month of the release of a report from the Gomery Commission, which is examining
allegations that the government improperly granted large and lucrative contracts to advertising agencies in the province of
Quebec in return for large and, in some instances, illegal campaign contributions. Days prior to the confidence vote, a
Conservative MP crossed the floor to join the governing Liberals (and become a member of Cabinet), thereby preventing
the fall of the government. The general expectation is that the Prime Minister will call an election early in 2006 to make
good on his promise.
3
Detterbeck (2005) and Koole (1996) note that the model is overloaded with assumptions. Any empirical analysis based on
it must necessarily pare it down to its essential contentions.
4
None of the allegations about contravention of the Canada Elections Act that emerged during the testimony before the
Gomery Commission can lead to prosecution, because at the time the Act required that prosecution for an offence occur
within 18 months of the time the alleged offence took place. The 2003 amendments to the Act stipulate a seven-year
window for prosecution, and require only that prosecution occur within 18 months of the Commissioner of Canada
Elections becoming aware of the alleged offence.
5
In fact, the President of the extra-parliamentary wing of the party publicly stated that the legislation was ‘as dumb as a bag
of hammers.’
6
A coalition of several smaller parties is challenging the constitutionality of the 2% threshold. In 2003, the Supreme Court
ruled in the Figueroa case that requiring political parties to run 50 candidates in order to qualify as registered parties was an
unconstitutional infringement on citizens’ right to vote, as it limited voters’ choices. The logic of the Figueroa ruling
suggests that this challenge will likely be successful.
7
The 2005 figures are projections based on the parties’ first-quarter 2005 disclosure reports.
8
It should be noted, however, that 2005 was not a typical election year. With a minority government in place, parties were
anticipating that an election could occur at any time. Through most of the second quarter of 2005, parties were on election
footing, as it appeared the government would fall imminently. Our projections for 2005 take this into account, and assume
that Quarter 1 fundraising is more typical. To this end, we have employed the following formula: (Quarter 1 x 3) + Quarter
2 = annual projection.
9
The Progressive Conservative Party was historically one of the two large parties that rotated in and out of government. It
formed the government from 1988 until 1993, presiding over a period of considerable turmoil stemming from its
unsuccessful attempts to amend the country’s constitution. In the 1993 election, the party was reduced to merely two seats
and much of its electoral support flowed to the Bloc Quebecois in Quebec, and the Reform Party in English Canada. The
Reform Party subsequently morphed into the Canadian Alliance. This latter party was unable to win significant numbers of
seats outside its electoral base in Western Canada. In 2003 the party merged with the Progressive Conservatives in an
attempt to reform into a national party that could form the government. In the 2004 election, it won 99 seats, second only to
the Liberals with 135 (of a total of 308 seats).
10
The legislation allows for both unions and corporations to contribute up to $1000 annually to either local Electoral District
Associations or candidates. Unions, however, are defined as the national organization, not as individual locals. Concerned
that unions could inadvertently break the law when two locals made contributions to different candidates, the party opted to
forbid its candidates from accepting union contributions. This points to an inequity in the legislation. While it does not
allow each branch of a company to make a contribution, it does allow each individual franchise to do so. For instance, each
of the over 2000 Tim Horton’s franchises in Canada could make an annual contribution of $1000, yielding a total
contribution of $2 million. The United Food and Commercial Workers, which represents close to a quarter million workers
and has over 75 locals, can contribute $1000 annually. Large unions like the UFCW represent employees in hundreds of
workplaces. Given that corporations vastly outnumber unions, treating them identically under the legislation does not
translate into equitable treatment under the law.
11
In fact, in a fundraising email sent to supporters in late June of 2005, it pointed out the party’s poor first-quarter
fundraising results and implored supporters to contribute to a better second-quarter showing.
12
During the 2004 election campaign, some of the Electoral District Associations that had raised the most money from
corporations (including Outremont, Terrebonne and Laval) made significant transfers (each in the tens of thousands of
dollars) to the Liberal Party. The EDA in Outremont, home to the party’s Quebec Lieutenant, in 2004 raised close to
$200,000 from individual contributors and another $70,000 from corporations. It transferred this money both to the national
party and to Liberal candidates in several other electoral districts prior to and during the election.