long-standing connections with Tyndall and his activism with the NF and other fascist
groups, Griffin sought to provide the party with a more youthful and respectable face.
Ideologically, the BNP toned-down its rhetoric somewhat: it no longer advocated the
forced deportation of all immigrants, it now supported “voluntary” repatriation; it stopped
preaching white supremacy, alleging instead that there are inherent differences between
the races (Eatwell 2004). Membership in the organization grew quickly, and the BNP’s
propaganda became more professional. Moreover, the party’s electoral strategy began
targeting specific groups of voters and paid closer attention to local grievances (Eatwell
2004). The BNP also has sought to exploit popular fears, fueled by the mass media, over
the number of refugees seeking asylum in Britain. This strategy helped the BNP
candidate in a 2000 special election in the south-east London borough of Bexley come in
second place with 26 percent of the vote (Kelso 2000).
The party attracted much attention in the summer of 2001 when riots in several
northern cities coincided with strong showings by several BNP candidates in the June
national election. About two weeks before the election, riots in the northern city of
Oldham brought tensions between the local white and Pakistani communities to the fore.
The unrest was instigated, at least in part, by BNP and NF activists, and the BNP sought
to exploit these ethnic tensions for electoral gain in the upcoming elections. In the
election, Griffin himself was standing as a candidate in the Oldham West and Royton
constituency and he received 16 percent of the vote, and the BNP candidate in the
neighboring constituency of Oldham East and Saddleworth won 11 percent of the poll.
This sequence of events in Oldham was reversed in the nearby northern town of Burnley.
There, a surprisingly strong performance by the BNP candidate in the election was
followed later in June by riots pitting white youths against Pakistani and Bangladeshi
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Convention