to support the actor; likewise, empirically we should find cases in which actors accept arguments
as legitimate despite their interest to the contrary. Similarly, coalitions react not only to the
argument, but to the person making the claims—accordingly, a legitimation’s success should
vary depending on whom is using it. From a network perspective, finally, coalition mobilization
need not have been anyone’s intention. For reasons described above, actors cannot fully predict
when and where legitimation strategies will resonate. Because of this, mobilization depends not
only on the intent of the actor, but on the complex interplay between claims and network
structures.
Ultimately, these consequences have profound effects on indivisibility. By increasing an
actor’s dependence on a coalition, mobilization can decrease flexibility at the bargaining table.
Previously embedded in multiple coalitions, an actor becomes restricted to a single claim, and
any deviation will appear to undermine his legitimacy. For example, Milosevic’s use of
inflammatory rhetoric over Kosovo ultimately locked him into a coalition of extreme Serbian
nationalists; as a result, he perceived that deviance from this strategy would lead to his
delegitimation as a political actor. In sum, by locking actors into single and incompatible claims,
coalition mobilization can construct conflict as indivisible.
Polarization. Legitimation strategies can also produce polarization, a switching effect that
severs ties between coalitions.
45
When legitimation strategies fail to resonate with a
coalition—when they appear illegitimate—this destroys network ties, widening “the political
and social space between claimants in a contentious episode.”
46
For example, after 1916 Sinn
Fein’s militant republican legitimations appeared illegitimate to several audiences, and thus
45
McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow, 2001, 322.
46
Ibid., 25
Convention