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Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy
Unformatted Document Text:  Introduction Indivisible territory is all too frequent in international politics. 1 In Jerusalem, many Israelis “insist that a united Jerusalem will be the eternal capital of the Jewish state,” whereas Palestinians contend that any deal excluding sovereignty over the city is “an unacceptable compromise…[that] will make their blood boil.” 2 India and Pakistan’s inability to compromise over Kashmir has increased tensions between these nuclear powers, and well before the age of nationalism Maria-Thérèse refused to negotiate with Frederick the Great over the territory of Silesia. Indivisibility is thus a central element of international conflict. In many cases, the very presence of an indivisible issue leads to negotiation failure. 3 But the irony is that as intractable as indivisible conflict seems, it is also malleable: territory that appears divisible at one time may prove indivisible in another, and vice versa. Jerusalem was not always treated as indivisible. While Israeli politicians pledge to maintain Jerusalem as the eternal and undivided capital of Jerusalem, earlier leaders were willing to divide the Holy City. Ireland too became indivisible—unable to be ruled by both the British and Irish— only in the 20 th century. This malleability raises the question of how territory becomes indivisible: under what conditions are actors unable to divide territory through partition, shared sovereignty, compensation, or other mechanisms of division? Given the significance of indivisible territory, the lack of attention devoted to this question is surprising. While economists theorize how indivisibility affects bargaining, their arguments address indivisibility primarily as a distribution problem, assuming the issue’s indivisibility and addressing how equitable distribution might be 1 On indivisibility and territory, see Walter 2000; Toft 2002 and 2003; and Hassner 2003. On indivisibility and war, see Fearon 1995, 389-390; Vasquez 1993; Newman, 1999, 16; and Pillar 1983. On indivisibility and negotiations,see Elster 1989, 67-78; Coleman 1990; Hirschman 1994; and Kniss 1996. 2 Gerald Butt, Jerusalem: Eternal, Intractable, New York Times, 31 January 2000, internet edition. 3 See Hirschman 1994; Albin 1993, 8; and Pillar 1983, 24.

Authors: Goddard, Stacie.
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Introduction
Indivisible territory is all too frequent in international politics.
1
In Jerusalem, many
Israelis “insist that a united Jerusalem will be the eternal capital of the Jewish state,” whereas
Palestinians contend that any deal excluding sovereignty over the city is “an unacceptable
compromise…[that] will make their blood boil.”
2
India and Pakistan’s inability to compromise
over Kashmir has increased tensions between these nuclear powers, and well before the age of
nationalism Maria-Thérèse refused to negotiate with Frederick the Great over the territory of
Silesia.
Indivisibility is thus a central element of international conflict. In many cases, the very
presence of an indivisible issue leads to negotiation failure.
3
But the irony is that as intractable
as indivisible conflict seems, it is also malleable: territory that appears divisible at one time may
prove indivisible in another, and vice versa. Jerusalem was not always treated as indivisible.
While Israeli politicians pledge to maintain Jerusalem as the eternal and undivided capital of
Jerusalem, earlier leaders were willing to divide the Holy City. Ireland too became
indivisible—unable to be ruled by both the British and Irish— only in the 20
th
century.
This malleability raises the question of how territory becomes indivisible: under what
conditions are actors unable to divide territory through partition, shared sovereignty,
compensation, or other mechanisms of division? Given the significance of indivisible territory,
the lack of attention devoted to this question is surprising. While economists theorize how
indivisibility affects bargaining, their arguments address indivisibility primarily as a distribution
problem, assuming the issue’s indivisibility and addressing how equitable distribution might be
1
On indivisibility and territory, see Walter 2000; Toft 2002 and 2003; and Hassner 2003. On indivisibility and war,
see Fearon 1995, 389-390; Vasquez 1993; Newman, 1999, 16; and Pillar 1983. On indivisibility and negotiations,
see Elster 1989, 67-78; Coleman 1990; Hirschman 1994; and Kniss 1996.
2
Gerald Butt, Jerusalem: Eternal, Intractable, New York Times, 31 January 2000, internet edition.
3
See Hirschman 1994; Albin 1993, 8; and Pillar 1983, 24.


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