William T. Barndt
September 2005
Princeton University
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Please do not cite or circulate without author permission.
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inconveniently opinionated are silenced until such time as the State Security Forces cease to repress
them.
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On the State Security Forces and Failed Assaults
Failed assaults always entailed the absence of support by the State Security Forces for the
assault. This could mean two things in practice: the State Security Forces were divided
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or they were
uninvolved.
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Either way, the State Security Forces were uncertain of their role in the conflict: they
hesitated, bickered amongst themselves, declared themselves neutral, or just seemed indifferent.
Indeed, it seems reasonable to conclude that this “non-position” was, in fact, a necessary condition
of assault failure. The lack of repression or threat of repression by the State Security Forces allowed
assaults to fail: this necessary condition, too, is non-spurious. But is it sufficient? As discussed
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It is worth pausing to consider whether this explanation is tautological; whether, as Mahoney puts it, I have
“identified a set of factors that are contained within the very definition of the outcome being considered. When this
happens, there is no temporal separation between the cause and the outcome…” (2000/2003: 348-9). Mahoney goes on
to argue that “comparative historical researchers who make claims about sufficient causes are not referring to these kinds
of tautological conditions” (349). Or are they? In one sense all sufficient causes can be understood as tautological given the
logic of set theory: All X are Y. Macro-historical research projects simply have the luxury of their readers perceiving vast
time spans having passed between causes and effects. The study of how actors cause outcomes over much shorter
periods of time inherently reduces the distance between cause and effect. But to claim that such studies’ conclusions are
inevitably tautological is to rule out any actor-based sufficient explanation of rapidly passing events.
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In 1997, vigorous debate about whether Bucaram should be removed from office was ongoing within the
Armed Forces at the time when he tried to intervene in radio broadcasts. (See, e.g., Section A of El Comercio 19-January-
1997 for the critical statements of Minister of Defense, retired General Victor Bayas.) Similarly, in 1999, Mahuad tried
to disperse demonstrations when dissent within the ranks of the military and National Police had already surfaced over
his unpopular bank-account freezes. (See, e.g., “Las FF.AA. piden tregua y diálogo,” El Comercio 12-July-1999: A1-A2;
Section A of El Comercio 25-June-1999: A3. Indeed, six months later the military broke ranks and deposed Mahuad. See
Gerlach 2001 & Lucero 2001 on these events.) In 1986, Febres Cordero’s sole failed assault was swamped and
overcome by the emergence of corruption accusations of high-level military corruption among lower ranked air-force
officers. This eventually led to the Vargas Pazzo revolts in early 1987. See Bustamante 1992 for a nice assessment of the
chronology. And in June-July 1994, the military and national police response to indigenous protests against agrarian
reform was brutal in some regions (e.g., Napo), but more uncertain in others (e.g., Pastaza). Of all the cases, this one was
the most difficult to code due to (1) the shifting and regionally divided position of the armed forces and (2) the unclear
historiography of this event. See Andolina 1994a; Andolina 1994b; and Sawyer (2004): Chapters 5 and 6, for a nice play-
by-play of the conflict.
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During the four other failed assaults, the State Security Forces were simply uninvolved. In 2003, the assault
was quashed by the active intervention of media capital before the State Security Forces were asked to intervene. In
2000, dissent within the ranks still permeated post-coup politics and allowed an alliance between indigenous
organizations, state officials, and capital to up-end Noboa’s assault. In 1980, the assault was largely confined to the
legislative arena. And, finally, the 1994 election assault took place entirely within the courts and legislature: Duran Ballen
never asked the State Security Forces to intervene. Citations for these assault conflicts are below.
Convention